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Credibility of Crime Allegations†
By Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen*
The lack of hard evidence in allegations about sexual misconduct 
makes it difficult to separate true allegations from false ones. We pro-
vide a model in which victims and potential libelers face the same 
costs and benefits from making an allegation, but the tendency for 
perpetrators of sexual misconduct to engage in repeat offenses allows 
semiseparation to occur, which lends credibility to such allegations. 
Our model also explains why reports about sexual misconduct are 
often delayed, and why the public rationally assigns less credibility 
to these delayed reports. (JEL D82, J16, K14, K42)
Recent scandals of sexual crimes and misconduct have gripped the headlines and spawned a nascent movement to raise consciousness about a serious prob-
lem that used to be  underreported. The stories of Bill Cosby, Larry Nassar, Harvey 
Weinstein, and many others share some striking similarities. First, the conduct 
involved mostly was not violent in nature, so that  clear-cut hard evidence is lack-
ing.1 Second, the same person repeatedly offended multiple victims. Third, no arrest 
or prosecution was made upon the first allegation against the offender. Fourth, many 
allegations were made years after the alleged incidents.
The Bill Cosby trial stemmed from an allegation made by Andrea Constand in 
2005 alleging that Bill Cosby, a comedian, drugged and raped her in 2004. This 
was the first public rape allegation against Cosby. No charge was brought against 
him at the time. Within the same year, three additional similar allegations against 
Cosby arose. Still, no arrest was made. A new wave of allegations surfaced in 2014 
and 2015, with over 50 women alleging sexual crimes that happened from 1965 to 
2008. Cosby was arrested and charged in 2015 and was convicted of three counts of 
aggravated indecent assault in 2018.2
1 According to End Violence Against Women’s research, “most sexual assaults are committed by someone who 
is known to the victim, who does not use a weapon or severe physical violence, and who does not inflict visible 
injuries on the victim.” See http://www.evawintl.org/Library/DocumentLibraryHandler.ashx?id=42.
2 Details of this case were widely reported in newspapers. We obtained our sources mostly from the Wikipedia 
article “Bill Cosby Sexual Assault Allegations.”
* Lee: Loyola University Chicago, 16 E Pearson St., Chicago, IL 60611 (email: francesxu312@gmail.com); 
Suen: The University of Hong Kong, Pok Fu Lam, Hong Kong (email: wsuen@econ.hku.edu). Michael Ostrovsky 
was coeditor for this article. We are thankful for suggestions from Mariagiovanna Baccara, Navin Kartik, Harry 
Di Pei, Kathy Spier, Bruno Strulovic, and Abraham Wickelgren. We also have benefited from comments by work-
shop participants at University of Texas at Austin and Nanyang Technological University and by the audience at 
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The Jerry Sandusky sexual abuse case is another notable example. Over a hun-
dred incidents of abuse of children were alleged over time against the former foot-
ball coach, but the first report in 2008 was met with disbelief. The state attorney 
general told the accuser in 2008 that the authorities needed more victims to charge 
Sandusky—that is, to overcome the grand jury’s doubt of a possibly false accusa-
tion. Sandusky was not arrested until the second report came from a witness in 2010, 
reporting an incident that happened more than ten years before.3
An estimated 64 to 96 percent of sexual crime victims do not report the crimes 
committed against them (Fisher et al. 2000, Perkins and Klaus 1996). A major rea-
son for this reluctance to report is that victims think their reports will be met with 
suspicion or outright disbelief (Jordan 2004). When the crimes do not produce hard 
evidence, there is a classic asymmetric information problem: a true victim can-
not easily separate himself or herself from a libeler who makes a false accusation. 
A libeler can be motivated by a grudge, political motives, publicity, or potential 
financial gains. In 2006, three Duke athletes were accused of sexual assault, which 
was later found baseless. In 2014, Rolling Stone published an article, “A Rape on 
Campus,” accusing several University of Virginia students of gang rape. The maga-
zine had to retract the article in its entirety because the rape allegation was discred-
ited. But not all false reporting is eventually rebuked. For allegations that do not 
present enough winning probability for the prosecutor to bring charges, there is no 
judgment from the jury whether or not they are true. No wonder  so-called estimates 
of the percentage of false accusations among all reports range widely from 1.5 to 
90 percent in the empirical literature (Lonsway, Archambault, and Lisak 2009).
While the percentage of false accusations is unclear, the potential of a report being 
false has to be the reason why sexual crime reports are not assigned a perfect cred-
ibility. Absent the possible existence of false accusers, the authorities would simply 
bring all cases to court, and the jury would always be able to convict beyond doubt. 
This is clearly not the reality. Tom Tremblay, an investigator in the sex crimes unit 
in Burlington, Vermont, said, “unlike any other crime I responded to in my career, 
there was always this thought that a rape report was a false report.”4 Understanding 
the circumstances that lend credibility to sexual crime allegations is important in the 
fight against these crimes.
This article studies the incentives to allege a crime by victims or by potential 
libelers in a  two-period setup. There may be multiple potential accusers who can 
make public but unverifiable reports against the same person. These accusers can 
choose whether or not to report, as well as when to report. We aim to address three 
major questions regarding these allegations. First, allegations of sexual crimes 
are often made of incidents that happened a long time ago, which we call delayed 
reports. These delayed reports can come from victims who are delaying to report a 
true crime, as demonstrated by the Sandusky case, or from libelers who are choosing 
3 Joseph Rhee, Gerry Wagschal, and Linh Tran, “Sandusky Victim 1 Steps Out of Shadows, Says Justice Took Too 
Long,” ABC News, October 19, 2012, https://abcnews.go.com/US/sandusky-victim-reveals-identity-justice-long/
story?id=17511612.
4 Rebecca Ruiz, “Why Don’t Cops Believe Rape Victims? Brain Science Helps Explain the Problem—and 
Solve It,” Slate, June 19, 2013, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/06/why-cops-dont-believe-rape-victims-
and-how-brain-science-can-solve-the-problem.html.
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to make false accusations long after the time of interaction with the accused. Why do 
delayed reports appear so often? Second, given the possibility of false  accusations, 
how much credence should be given to allegations that are unsubstantiated by wit-
nesses or physical evidence? Third, a delayed report is typically met with suspicion. 
For example, in October 2016, supporters of Donald Trump had started the hashtag 
#NextFakeTrumpVictim by attacking the sexual assault allegations against Trump 
with tweets that read, for example, “Why didn’t these ‘victims’ come forward 30 
years ago? Could’ve scored a hefty sum from a billionaire.” Is such skepticism 
justified?
A key to our analysis is that sexual crimes are often committed by recidivists, who 
have a tendency to engage in repeat offenses against other victims. According to the 
Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network (RAINN), more than half of all alleged 
rapists have at least one prior conviction. Taking into account the low reporting rate 
and the low conviction rate,5 this statistic suggests a strong tendency for rapists to 
engage in repeat offenses. In addition, the medical literature suggests that “pedo-
philia is a sexual orientation and unlikely to change.”6 In this paper, we assume that 
a true victim expects a higher chance that another victim exists who may provide 
corroboration than a potential libeler does.
The possibility of the existence of another victim or another potential libeler pro-
duces a  freeriding problem. Because a single accusation is often insufficient evi-
dence to cause the authorities to take action, individuals have an incentive to take 
a  wait-and-see approach and delay making an allegation until another allegation 
arises. In our basic model, an individual with relatively low reporting cost always 
reports immediately, whereas an individual with higher reporting cost makes a 
delayed report if and only if there is another report against the accused.7
On the surface, given that there is a higher chance of having a corroborator for 
a victim than for a libeler, one might suspect that a victim is more inclined to wait 
for others to report first in order to delay the cost of making an allegation. We argue 
that this reasoning is not correct, because it assumes that the potential corrobora-
tor’s reporting behavior is not affected by the history he or she observes. In fact, the 
potential corroborator (past or future victim) is more likely to report if there has 
been a previous report, so the higher incentive to “break the silence” and encourage 
the potential corroborator to report dominates the motive to delay reporting costs 
for individuals with low reporting costs. This dynamic encouragement effect works 
in the opposite direction of the standard  freeriding effect in public goods provision. 
Because guilty agents have a higher tendency of recidivism than do innocent ones, 
the encouragement effect figures more prominently for true victims than for poten-
tial libelers. This effect causes true victims to be less inclined to make a delayed 
report than are potential libelers. The fact that true victims tend to make timely 
crime allegations with a higher probability in turn lends credence to such allega-
tions, allowing a  semiseparating equilibrium to exist even when true victims and 
5 RAINN estimates that only 310 out of 1,000 rape cases are reported, out of which 11 will get referred to pros-
ecutors and 7 will result in a felony conviction.
6 Harvard Medical School, “Pessimism about Pedophilia,” Harvard Mental Health Letter, July 2010, https://
www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/pessimism-about-pedophilia.
7 This potential  freeriding incentive is called a “first mover disadvantage” in Ayres and Unkovic (2012).
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potential libelers face the same costs and benefits from making an allegation. In 
other words, even though allegations are unsubstantiated by hard evidence, they do 
contain information that may prompt the authorities into taking action.8
Our model also justifies the public’s skepticism toward delayed reports. If there 
is another allegation against a person, victims or libelers who took a  wait-and-see 
approach will no longer shy from making an allegation because corroborated reports 
are more convincing than a single report. But because libelers have a greater proba-
bility of taking a  wait-and-see approach than victims do, the public rationally assigns 
less credibility to delayed reports than to undelayed ones. The public is rightly skep-
tical because delayed reports are more likely to have been made “opportunistically.”
The communication game described in this article is different from a cheap 
talk game (Crawford and Sobel 1982). Here the action of reporting carries a cost, 
whereas the action of not reporting does not. Reporting is directly costly for many 
reasons. Reporters often have to reveal facts about themselves that are not positive, 
such as the use of drugs and alcohol, which can lead to social stigma, suspension 
from school, or loss of scholarships.9 Reporters face possible retaliation from the 
accused. Investigations are emotionally and physically exhausting. The easier thing 
to do is stay silent.
In order to highlight the difficulties in separating truthful allegations from fake 
ones, we purposefully avoid the traditional channel of signaling arising from payoff 
differences. Both a true victim and a potential libeler in our model have the same 
costs of reporting and the same payoffs from the authorities’ decisions.10 In this 
sense, our model is different from a standard signaling game (Spence 1973). In our 
model, different types (victim or libeler) would behave in exactly the same way if 
they are sure that another victim or libeler does not exist. It is the assumption that 
victims and libelers expect different probabilities that another accuser may exist that 
causes their equilibrium strategies to be different.
Farrell and Saloner (1985) studies the adoption of technology standards or polit-
ical positions with network benefits, where a player benefits from waiting to see 
what the other player chooses as the standard or the position. Ostrovsky and Schwarz 
(2005) considers synchronization of timing in this framework, in which early arrival 
and late adoption are both costly. In that setup, players simultaneously choose an 
adoption time with some stochastic error; there is no encouragement effect because 
the move of one player is not observable by other players. Daughety and Reinganum 
(2011) studies a dynamic model of victims choosing when to file a lawsuit against 
a common defendant, where a plaintiff is more likely to win if more victims sue. In 
our paper, given the beliefs of the decision maker in a corroboration equilibrium, 
the two victims play a game that is similar to those in Farrell and Saloner (1985) 
8 This information comes from equilibrium inference, which may not constitute evidence that is admissible in 
court. However, it may be sufficient to induce the authorities to conduct further investigations that lead to arrest or 
prosecution.
9 An accuser of rape at Brigham Young University was suspended because of the revelation that she used illegal 
drugs. (Jack Healy, “At Brigham Young, A Cost in Reporting a Rape,” New York Times, April 26, 2016, https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/04/27/us/rape-victims-brigham-young-university-honor-code-suspensions.html).
10 In Chandrasekhar, Golub, and Yang (2018), different types have the same costs and benefits from taking 
a signaling action (asking for help), and partial separation is achieved in equilibrium because the distribution of 
benefits is different for different types.
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and Daughety and Reinganum (2011): relative to the status quo, an action brings a 
benefit if coordination succeeds and a cost otherwise. In Farrell and Saloner (1985), 
there is no uncertainty about the existence of the other player. Closer to our paper, 
the plaintiffs in Daughety and Reinganum (2011) also have the  trade-off between 
taking a costly action to encourage others and waiting to observe whether others are 
present. The coordination benefits for the victims as well as the libelers in our paper 
are endogenously determined through the reports’ credibility, which in turn depends 
on the decision maker’s equilibrium Bayesian inferences about different behaviors 
of the victims and the libelers. Two reports in our model are not necessarily more 
credible than one report: equilibriums with coordination benefit may not exist. In 
contrast, in Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Daughety and Reingamum (2011), the 
coordination benefit is exogenously assumed.
Pei and Strulovici (2019), a recent working paper, also studies the credibility of 
allegations with no hard evidence. It focuses on the incentive of a strategic crimi-
nal to commit crime on multiple potential victims. The victims and  nonvictims all 
choose whether or not to report simultaneously, so an allegation cannot be delayed 
in their setup. A  nonvictim (who may have a libeling incentive) in that setup thinks 
that it is likely that there are other victims, while a victim thinks that it is less likely 
that there are other victims because it is in the interest of the criminal to refrain from 
abusing widely to avoid multiple allegations. So, contrary to our setting, that libeler 
believes the chance of having a corroborator to be bigger than a true victim believes. 
Because of this, the crime allegation becomes arbitrarily uninformative as the pun-
ishment level for the criminal goes up.
This article is also related to Chassang and Miquel (2014), a study of unverifiable 
reporting by whistle-blowers. That study takes a mechanism design approach, in 
which the cost of reporting arises endogenously as retaliation from the accused. In 
that model there is a single monitor who may potentially report on inappropriate 
behavior of an agent. Our article focuses more on the incentive issues that arise 
when more than one victim (or more than one libeler) can make allegations against 
the same agent in a dynamic setting. We adopt a  reduced-form approach by taking 
the distribution of reporting costs as given, but there is discounting in reporting 
costs if accusers make delayed reports. For sexual harassment in the workplace, the 
exogenous reporting costs in our model may reflect the possibility of retaliation by 
the accused or by the employer,11 and these costs can be substantially lower if the 
accuser has left the firm by the time he or she makes a delayed report.
Chamley and Gale (1994) studies a model of endogenous delay in a framework 
in which there is informational externality but no payoff externality. That paper 
shows that potential investors may delay their projects in the hope of learning 
about the existence of other potential investors. The model exhibits clustering 
in investment decisions, similar to the appearance of  follow-on reports after the 
first allegation is made in our model. In our model of allegations about sexual 
crimes, the externality involved is a direct payoff externality coming from the 
possibility of corroboration. Delay may also occur in the investment game in Gale 
11 In a sample of 86 state workers studied in Loy and Stewart (1984), 62 percent reported retaliation by their 
employers following their responses to harassment.
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(1995), because the benefit of investing increases in the number of investors, and 
investing early before the others is  money losing initially. Gale (1995) finds that in 
some equilibrium there is an encouragement effect: investing early encourages 
others to invest. The literature on the dynamic provision of public goods (e.g., 
Fershtman and Nitzan 1991, Marx and Matthews 2000) also focuses on payoff 
externalities, but the existence of other players is not taken to be uncertain in that 
literature or in Gale (1995). Furthermore, our article analyzes how the endoge-
nous timing of reporting behavior affects the credibility of these reports, which is 
not an issue in the dynamic public goods provision problem.
In Section I of the article, we lay out the setup of our signaling game. Section II 
analyzes the equilibrium we are most interested in—a corroboration equilibrium 
in which multiple reports may happen on the equilibrium path and some reports 
may be delayed. We provide a brief discussion of other types of equilibria in 
Section III. In Section IV, we extend the basic model in different ways and discuss 
how these modifications affect the analysis and our main conclusions. Our formal 
model provides a framework to study a recently developed reporting system of 
sexual crimes: the online information escrow (Ayres and Unkovic 2012). Such an 
analysis is developed in Section V of the article. An information escrow allows 
people to place allegations into an escrow on the condition that the allegations are 
transferred to the authorities if and only if a  prespecified number of allegations 
are lodged against the same person. A system, using a  prespecified number of 
two, called the “Callisto reporting system,” has been developed into operation and 
was adopted by eight universities by 2017.12 The basic idea is that information 
escrows can remove victims’ incentive to wait for corroboration. We point out, 
however, that the credibility of two reports from a Callisto system is lower than 
the credibility of two reports outside a Callisto system. Depending on the standard 
of credibility expected by the authorities to take action, forcing all reports to go 
through the Callisto system may sometimes cause victims to be less forthcoming 
in reporting crimes than without the Callisto system.
I. The Model
An agent  A is active for two periods. Agent  A can be of two types: “guilty” 
or “innocent.” The prior probability that  A is a guilty type is  μ 0 . With proba-
bility  1 −  μ 0 ,  A is innocent. Guilty  A hurts a person (and therefore breaks the 
law) with some probability in each period. We call the victim harmed in the 
first period  V 1 and the victim harmed in the second period  V 2 . If  A is innocent, 
a potential libeler holding a grudge against  A appears with some probability in 
each period. We call the potential libeler who emerged in the first period  L 1 and 
the one who emerged in the second period  L 2 . In the basic model the behavior 
of  A is  nonstrategic.13 The focus of our analysis is the behavior of victims and 
12 Further information about this system is available at https://www.projectcallisto.org.
13 In Section IVC, we discuss the case where the guilty agent strategically chooses whether or not to commit a 
crime in each period and the innocent one strategically chooses whether or not to exercise caution to avoid being 
libeled. The qualitative results remain the same.
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 potential libelers. The existence of victims and the existence of potential libelers 
are  mutually exclusive in the basic model.14 Table 1 shows the probability of exis-
tence of victims and potential libelers given the two states.
Table 1—Probability of Different Scenarios of Existence of Victims and Potential Libelers
Guilty  A Innocent  A 
 V 1 No  V 1  L 1 No  L 1 
 V 2  p λ v  (1 − p) λ v  L 2  q λ l  (1 − q) λ l 
No  V 2  (1 − p) λ v  1 − (2 − p) λ v No  L 2  (1 − q) λ l  1 − (2 − q) λ l 
 The entry in each cell represents the probability of the corresponding combina-
tion. All parameters— p ,  q ,  λ v , and  λ l —are between  0 and  1 . For example, if  A is 
guilty, the probability that both  V 1 and  V 2 exist is  p λ v . Note that the marginal proba-
bility that  V 1 exists is  λ v , and the marginal probability that  V 2 exists is also  λ v . Each 
victim knows that she is hurt by the guilty agent  A . On the basis of this knowledge, 
she assigns conditional probability  p that another victim exists in the other period. 
A higher value of  p indicates a higher degree of correlation across the two periods. 
As we mention in the introduction, many sexual crimes are perpetrated by repeat 
offenders.15 On the other hand, if an innocent agent inadvertently offends another 
person, there is no presumption that this will happen again in the next period. We 
capture this difference by the following crucial assumption.
ASSUMPTION 1: p > q.
Suppose  A is a guilty type. If  V 1 and  V 2 do not exist, then nothing happens. Because 
crimes are perpetrated in secrecy (unless there is a report of the crime), the victim 
does not know whether  A had committed a similar crime before, nor whether  A will 
commit a similar crime in the future. We capture this uncertainty by assuming that  V t (for  t = 1, 2 ) does not know whether she lives in period 1 or period 2. Ex ante, she 
assigns probability  1/2 to each of these two possibilities.16
A victim derives utility from getting  A arrested. We normalize this payoff to  1 . 
However, reporting a crime is costly. We denote the cost of reporting by  c and assume 
that it is an independent draw from the uniform distribution on  [0, 1] . A victim knows 
her own cost  c , but outsiders do not observe her cost. The victim applies a discount 
factor  δ ≤ 1 to benefits that are obtained or costs that are incurred a period later. 
All reports are public.
14 A more natural story is to let a guilty agent face both victims and potential libelers and an innocent one face 
only potential libelers. In Section IVB, we show that this difference between the guilty and the innocent alone can 
generate credibility of a report.
15 Groth, Longo, and McFadin (1982) finds that the majority of sexual crime offenders had been convicted more 
than once for a sexual assault. Moreover, on average, they admitted to having committed two to five times as many 
sex crimes for which they were not apprehended.
16 Alternatively, we can allow each victim to know whether she is harmed in period 1 or period 2, which will 
not change the main results. We maintain the uncertain timing assumption in our basic model for its realism and its 
simpler notations. The case of known timing is briefly discussed in Appendix B.
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Victim  V 1 is harmed by  A in period 1 (although she does not know that she lives 
in period 1). She can lodge a public allegation once, either in period 1 or in period 2. 
First, she can report the crime immediately in period 1. Let  α(c) represent the proba-
bility that she chooses to immediately report the crime, and let  a ≡ E [α(c)] , where 
the expectation is taken over possible realizations of  c . Thus,  a is the ex ante prob-
ability that a victim will immediately report a crime in the absence of a prior report 
against agent  A . Second, if  V 1 does not report in period 1, she can lodge a delayed 
report at the end of period 2, after learning whether or not another victim has made 
an allegation against  A . We let  α ˆ 1 (c) represent the probability that  V 1 lodges a 
delayed report in period 2 if she has learned that another complaint has been made, 
and let  α ̃ 1 (c) represent the probability that she lodges a delayed report in period 2 if 
no other victim has made a complaint.
Victim  V 2 is harmed in period 2. She can lodge a complaint in period 2. If no one 
has accused  A before, then  V 2 does not know whether she is  V 1 or  V 2 . In this case, her 
strategy is the same as that of  V 1 in period 1, i.e., she reports the crime immediately 
with probability  α(c) , but she will have no chance to lodge a delayed report because 
she lives in the last period.17 If someone has lodged a complaint against  A , then  V 2 
observes this report and knows that she lives in period 2. We use  α ˆ 2 (c) to represent 
the probability that  V 2 complains against  A , knowing that there is a prior allegation 
against him.
Potential libelers (if they exist) hold a grudge against an innocent agent  A . They 
derive a payoff of  1 from getting  A arrested. Their costs of lodging a complaint are 
independent draws from the uniform distribution on  [0, 1] , and their discount factor 
is the same  δ as used by the victims. In other words, the payoff structure for potential 
libelers is identical to that for true victims. A priori, it is not obvious whether the 
costs and benefits of making an allegation are higher or lower for potential libelers 
than for true victims. We make the assumption that their payoffs are identical to 
highlight the difficulty of making inferences when there are no systematic differ-
ences in payoffs.18 For convenience, we sometimes refer to potential libelers simply 
as libelers, even though they may not choose to make an allegation in equilibrium.
The information structure for libelers mirrors that for victims. If no prior com-
plaint has been filed against  A , a libeler does not know whether she is  L 1 or  L 2 , and 
she lodges a complaint immediately with probability  β(c) . We define  b ≡ E [ β(c)] . 
All other notations parallel those for victims:  L 1 files a delayed report with proba-
bility  β ˆ 1 (c) after  L 2 ’s complaint;  L 1 files a delayed report with probability  β ̃ 1 (c) if  L 2 
does not file a complaint; and  L 2 files a complaint with probability  β ˆ 2 (c) after  L 1 ’s 
complaint. The only difference in the information between a libeler and a victim is 
that the former knows  A is innocent, whereas the latter knows  A is guilty.
If a report alleges that a crime happened in the same period, we call it an unde-
layed report. If a report alleges that a crime happened a period earlier, we call it a 
delayed report. The decision maker (the police authorities, for example) initially 
also does not know which period she is in, and assigns prior probability  1/2 to either 
possibility. If no one makes a complaint against  A (we denote this event by  ϕ ), the 
17 For example, we may assume that the whereabouts of agent  A are no longer traceable after period 2.
18 In Section IVD, we show that such differences, if they exist, would lead to predicable outcomes.
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decision maker cannot arrest  A . Whether a report is delayed or not is observable to 
the decision maker. She decides whether or not to arrest agent  A after the following 
observable outcomes: (i) there was only one undelayed report in the current period
(event  r ), (ii) there was only one delayed report in the current period (denoted  R ),
(iii) there was only one undelayed report in the previous period and no report in the
current period (event  rϕ ), (iv) there was one undelayed report in the previous period
and another undelayed report in the current period (event  rr ), and (v) there was one
undelayed report in the current period followed by one delayed report (event  rR ).
For   ∈ {r, R, rϕ, rr, rR } , let  μ() represent the decision maker’s posterior belief
that  A is a guilty type conditional on event   . For simplicity, we just assume that the
decision maker is bound to arrest  A as soon as  μ() is greater than or equal to some
threshold standard  μ ˆ , which is taken to be exogenous.19 The game ends at the end of
period 2 or whenever  A is arrested. When the game moves on to the second period, 
if a victim or a libeler finds that she can still report after a period has passed, she 
basically knows that she is in period 2. Similarly, if a decision maker finds that she 
can still make an arrest after a period has passed, she knows that she is in period 2.
The timing of the game when  A is guilty is illustrated in Figure 1. The timing of 
the game when  A is innocent is the same, with  V t replaced by  L t for  t = 1, 2 .
II. Corroboration Equilibrium with Occasional Delay
In this section, we focus on an equilibrium in which events  rr and  rR both appear 
with positive probability on the equilibrium path; that is, it is possible to observe 
multiple allegations against the same agent, and sometimes these allegations are 
delayed. In such an equilibrium, both  rr and  rR lead to an arrest; otherwise, they 
will not appear in equilibrium. Moreover, the events  r or  rϕ will not lead to an arrest,
because if they do, then no one will follow up with a report.
In other words, we look for an equilibrium in which  A is arrested if and only 
if there are two allegations against him. We refer to this type of equilibrium as 
a “corroboration equilibrium with occasional delay,” or simply a corroboration 
equilibrium.
19 The threshold standard can be determined by the decision maker’s costs of making type I and type II errors.
Figure 1. The Timeline When  A Is Guilty
Notes: This figure shows the case in which  A strikes a victim in each period. If there is no crime, there is no report-











Period 1 Period 2
VOL. 12 NO. 1 229LEE AND SUEN: CREDIBILITY OF CRIME ALLEGATIONS
Let  ℓ( ) represent the likelihood ratio of event   (given the guilty type rela-
tive to the innocent type). For any fixed prior  μ 0 , there is a monotone relation-
ship between  μ( ) and  ℓ( ) . Thus, one can also say that the decision rule of the 
 authorities is to arrest  A if and only if  ℓ( ) ≥  ℓ ˆ, where  ℓ ˆ =  μ ˆ (1 −  μ 0 )/(  μ 0 (1 −  μ ˆ )) . 
We sometimes refer to  ℓ ˆ as the standard of proof. The existence of a corroboration 
equilibrium requires  ℓ(rr) and  ℓ(rR) to be greater than or equal to the standard of 
proof  ℓ ˆ, and  ℓ(r) ,  ℓ(R) , and  ℓ(rϕ) to be less than  ℓ ˆ. We proceed by assuming these 
conditions and then verify that they indeed hold in equilibrium.
Given the assumed conditions of the likelihood ratios described above, a silent vic-
tim  V 1 who observes another person lodging a report against  A in period 2 will surely 
lodge a delayed complaint, because doing so gives a payoff of  1 at a cost  c ≤ 1 . 
Therefore,  α ˆ 1 (c) = 1 for any  c . Similarly, a victim  V 2 who knows of a prior com-
plaint against  A will also lodge a complaint upon being hurt. Therefore,  α ˆ 2 (c) = 1 
for any  c . On the other hand, a silent victim  V 1 has no incentive to report against  A 
at the end of period 2 if no other victim has come forward. Therefore,  α ̃ 1 (c) = 0 
for any  c . The payoff structure of libelers is identical to the payoff structure of true 
victims. Thus,  β ˆ 1 (c) =  β ˆ2 (c) = 1 and  β ̃ 1 (c) = 0 for any  c .
Consider now a victim of  A who is just harmed in the current period and has not 
seen a prior accusation against  A . For convenience, we label her a new victim (even 
though she may be the second victim if the first one did not report). A new victim 
can entertain three possibilities:
 (i) Another victim does not exist. The probability of this event (conditional on 
her knowledge of her own existence) is  (1 − p)  λ v / λ v = 1 − p .
 (ii) She is  V 1 , and another victim  V 2 exists in period 2. The probability (condi-
tional on her knowledge of her own existence) is  (1/2) p λ v / λ v = (1/2) p .
 (iii) She is  V 2 , and another victim  V 1 exists but did not report. The prob-
ability (conditional on her knowledge of her own existence) is 
(1/2) p λ v (1 − a)/ λ v = (1/2) p(1 − a) .
The sum of these probabilities is  1 − (1/2) pa .
In the first eventuality, one report is not sufficient to arrest  A because  ℓ(r) 
<  ℓ ˆ. Therefore, reporting immediately is futile (i.e., the payoff is  0 ). In the sec-
ond eventuality, reporting immediately will encourage the future victim  V 2 to report 
because  α ˆ 2 (c) = 1 . The discounted benefit is  δ . In the third eventuality, reporting 
immediately will cause the past victim  V 1 to come forward with a delayed report 
because  α ˆ 1 (c) = 1 . This leads to the arrest of  A in the same period, with a payoff 
of  1 . Therefore, if the new victim has reporting cost  c , the expected net payoff from 
reporting immediately is
(1)  1 − p _______ 
1 − (1/2) pa  [−c] +  
(1/2) p
 _______ 
1 − (1/2) pa  [δ − c] +  
(1/2) p (1 − a) 
  _________
1 − (1/2) pa  [1 − c] . 
If the new victim does not report immediately, then only in the second eventual-
ity can she follow up with a delayed report provided that  V 2 makes a complaint 
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against  A . The probability that  V 2 will make a complaint conditional on this 
eventuality is  a , and the discounted net benefit is  δ(1 − c) . Therefore, the expected 
net payoff from not reporting immediately is
(2)  1 − p _______ 
1 − (1/2) pa  [0] +  
(1/2) p
 _______ 
1 − (1/2) pa  [aδ (1 − c) ] +  
(1/2) p (1 − a) 
  _________
1 − (1/2) pa  [0] . 
Let  f (c, a; p) represent the payoff difference between reporting immediately and 
not reporting immediately for a new victim, given that other victims are adopting the 
strategies  α ˆ 1 (c) = 1 ,  α ˆ 2 (c) = 1 ,  α ̃ 1 (c) = 0 , and  E[α(c)] = a :
(3)  f  (c, a; p) =  1 − p _______ 1 − (1/2) pa  [−c] 
 +  (1/2) p _______ 
1 − (1/2) pa  [δ − c − aδ (1 − c) ] +  
(1/2) p (1 − a) 
  _________
1 − (1/2) pa  [1 − c] . 
For any  a and  p ,  f (⋅ , a; p) is strictly decreasing, with  f (0, a; p) > 0 > f (1, a; p) . 
Therefore, there exists  c ˆ(a, p) satisfying  f ( c ˆ(a, p), a; p) = 0 such that the best 
response is to report immediately (i.e., choose  α(c) = 1 ) if and only if  c ≤  c ˆ(a, p) . 
Because  a = E [α(c)] and the distribution of  c is uniform, equilibrium requires 
 c ˆ( a ∗ , p) =  a ∗ .
In a similar fashion, the payoff difference between reporting immediately and not 
reporting immediately for a new libeler (i.e., a libeler who does not observe a prior 
report against  A ) is  f (c, b; q) . Equilibrium requires that  f ( b ∗ ,  b ∗ ; q) = 0 , with the 
new libeler choosing  β(c) = 1 if and only if  c ≤  b ∗ .
Before contrasting the behavior of a new victim and a new libeler, we will first 
point out two important incentives reflected in the net benefit function  f (c, a; p) : 
strategic substitution and the encouragement effect.
LEMMA 1 (Strategic Substitution): The net benefit  f (c, a; p) of reporting immedi-
ately is decreasing in  a .
If other new victims are more likely to report immediately ( a increases), then 
a new victim is less likely to do so ( c ˆ(a, p) decreases). This strategic substitution 
in reporting immediately among new victims (or new libelers) reflects the public 
good nature of crime allegations when a single report is not sufficient to lead to 
arrest. Each victim who has not observed an allegation against  A has an incentive 
to take a  wait-and-see approach. First, if another report later comes to surface, the 
new victim can reduce the cost by lodging a delayed report, which is beneficial 
when  δ < 1 . Second, if the other victim does not even exist, the new victim can 
eliminate the cost of making a futile report. The new victim assigns a higher prob-
ability to the  nonexistence of the other victim when  a is higher. The downside of 
this  wait-and-see approach for a new victim is that  A may not be arrested if (i) the 
new victim is  V 2 and  V 1 did not report, or (ii) the new victim is  V 1 and  V 2 does not 
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choose to be the first one to report. Both of these two events are less likely when  a 
is higher, so the downside risk is believed to be smaller when  a is higher, which 
explains the strategic substitution effect.
LEMMA 2 (Encouragement Effect): The net benefit  f (c, a; p) of reporting immedi-
ately is increasing in  p .
It may appear that the  freeriding problem20 is more severe when the other victim 
is more likely to exist—in equation (2) the payoff from not reporting is increasing 
in  p . However,  freeriding is not the only incentive in our setting, as the model also 
exhibits complementarity between the possibly two victims through an encourage-
ment effect. First, if a new victim is  V 1 , and if  V 2 exists, then by reporting imme-
diately the new victim raises the probability that the future victim  V 2 will report 
the crime from  E[α(c)] = a to  α ˆ 2 (c) = 1 . Second, if a new victim is  V 2 , but  V 1 
did not report, then by reporting immediately the new victim raises the probability 
that  V 1 will make a delayed  follow-on report from  α ̃ 1 (c) = 0 to  α ˆ 1 (c) = 1 . These 
two effects imply that the payoff of reporting immediately in equation (1) increases 
in  p . Lemma 2 shows that the impact of  p on equation (1) dominates the impact on 
equation (2); so, taken together, a higher chance of the existence of another victim 
gives more incentive for a new victim to report immediately. The intuition can be 
understood by considering the extreme case when  δ = 1 . When reporting early, 
one is sure to encourage the future victim if that victim exists. When reporting late, 
one can only  freeride on the future victim if that victim exists and also reports. The 
chance of the latter is clearly smaller because the future victim is willing to lead only 
if her cost of reporting is small enough but is always willing to follow.
The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 are provided in Appendix A. Note that these 
results are generally valid for any distribution of reporting cost. Lemmas 1 and 2 
also apply to the incentive of new libelers. Moreover, Lemma 2 implies that the 
encouragement effect is stronger for new victims than for new libelers because  p is 
greater than  q . This leads to the following result.
PROPOSITION 1: In a corroboration equilibrium, new victims report immedi-
ately against  A with a strictly higher probability than do new libelers. Moreover,  a ∗ 
increases in  p and  δ , and  b ∗ increases in  q and  δ .
PROOF:
In a corroboration equilibrium,  a ∗ satisfies  F ( a ∗ ; p) = 0 , where
(4)  F (a; p) ≡ f  (a, a; p) 
 =  1/2 ___________ 
1 − (1/2) pa  [−a (2 − pa) + pδ (1 − a (1 − a) ) + p (1 − a) ] . 
20 When  freeriding on the other accuser, one eventually still needs to file a report to corroborate if the other 
reports, but filing later saves expected reporting costs.
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Since  f (c, a; p) is decreasing in  a (Lemma 1) and in  c ,  F (a; p) is decreasing in  a . 
Also,  F (0; p) > 0 > F (1; p) . Hence, there exists a unique  a ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such 
that  F ( a ∗ ; p) = 0 . Lemma 2 implies that  F (a; p) increases in  p . By the implicit 
function theorem, an increase in  p raises  a ⁎ . Because the equilibrium  b ∗ satisfies 
 F ( b ∗ ; q) = 0 ,  p > q implies  a ∗ >  b ∗ . Finally, because  F (a; p) increases in  δ ,  a ∗ is 
increasing in  δ . Likewise,  b ∗ is increasing in  δ . ∎
The fact that  a ∗ >  b ∗ in a corroboration equilibrium lends credibility 
to allegations about sexual crimes. If victims and libelers report with equal 
probability, the likelihood ratio of an undelayed report (event  r ) would be sim-
ply  λ v / λ l . We can take  λ v / λ l to be the “face value” of a crime allegation. However, 
Proposition 1 implies that the likelihood ratio in the event of an undelayed report is 
 λ v  a ∗ /( λ l  b ∗ ) >  λ v / λ l . The additional credibility is the result of equilib-
rium inference, coming from the reasoning that true victims are more likely 
to make an undelayed report than libelers are. Furthermore, we also have the 
following result.
PROPOSITION 2: In a corroboration equilibrium, two undelayed reports against 
A are assigned a greater credibility than one undelayed report corroborated by a 
delayed report.
PROOF:
Suppose agent  A is guilty. The event   = rR is observed only 
when both  V 1 and  V 2 exist,  V 1 has cost above  a 
∗ , and  V 2 has cost below 
 a ∗ . The probability of this event is  p λ v  a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ ) , and the likelihood ratio is  ℓ(rR) = p λ v  a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ )/(q λ l  b ∗ (1 −  b ∗ )) . The event   = rr is observed only when 
both  V 1 and  V 2 exist, and  V 1 has cost below  a 
∗ ( V 2 will always report when  V 1 has 
reported in the earlier period). The likelihood ratio is  ℓ(rr) = p λ v  a ∗ /(q λ l  b ∗ ) . By 
Proposition 1,  a ∗ >  b ∗ , which implies  ℓ(rr) > ℓ(rR) . ∎
Proposition 2 is consistent with common attacks on the credibility of accusa-
tions that surface long after the alleged crimes. In a corroboration equilibrium, true 
victims are more likely than libelers to lodge an undelayed complaint against  A 
if there is no prior complaint against him, but everyone (true victim or not) can 
secure an arrest of  A if there is already a prior complaint. Because libelers are 
more likely to take a  wait-and-see approach, the public rationally believes that 
delayed reports are more likely to be “opportunistic” and assigns less credibility 
to them.
PROPOSITION 3: A corroboration equilibrium exists if and only if
  ℓ ˆ ∈  ( ℓ _ ∗ ,  ℓ –∗ ] ≡  (  λ v (2 − p) a 
∗ 
 ___________
 λ l (2 − q) b ∗ ,   
p λ v  a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ ) 
  ____________
q λ l  b ∗ (1 −  b ∗ ) ] . 
Moreover, there exists  p –(δ ) , which is decreasing in  δ and greater than  2/3 , such that 
the range  (  ℓ _ ∗ ,  ℓ –∗ ] is  nonempty for all  p ≤  p –(δ ) .
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PROOF:
Suppose  A is a guilty type. Given the strategy profile in a corroboration equi-
librium, there are two possibilities that lead to the event  r : (i) the current period is 
period 1 and  V 1 reported (this happens with probability ( 1/2) λ v  a ∗ ); and (ii) the 
current period is period 2,  V 1 didn’t exist, and  V 2 reported (this happens with proba-
bility  (1/2)(1 − p) λ v  a ∗ ). Therefore, the probability of observing  r given  A is guilty 
is  (1/2) λ v  a ∗ (2 − p) . Similarly, the probability of observing  r given  A is innocent 
is  (1/2) λ l  b ∗ (2 − q) . This gives  ℓ(r) =  ℓ _ ∗ . The event  rϕ happens if  V 1 exists and makes 
an immediate report but  V 2 does not exist, which occurs with probability  (1 − p) λ v  a ∗ . 
The corresponding likelihood ratio is  ℓ(r ϕ) = (1 − p) λ v  a ∗ /((1 − q) λ l  b ∗ ) <  ℓ _ ∗ . 
In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that  ℓ(rR) =  ℓ – ∗ < ℓ(rr) . The event  R is 
 off equilibrium. We can assign an  off-equilibrium belief such that  ℓ(R) <  ℓ ˆ. This 
establishes that a corroboration equilibrium exists if and only if  ℓ ˆ ∈ (ℓ(r), ℓ(rR)] .
The range  (  ℓ _ ∗ ,  ℓ –∗ ] is  nonempty if and only if
  
p (1 −  a ∗ ) 
 _
2 − p >  
q (1 −  b ∗ ) 
 _
2 − q . 
The  left-hand side of the inequality above is equal to the  right-hand side when 
p = q . Because  p > q , it suffices to show that the  left-hand side is increasing in  p 
, which is equivalent to
(5)  2 (1 −  a ∗ ) − p (2 − p)  ∂ a ∗  _∂ p > 0. 
By implicit differentiation of (4),
  ∂ a ∗  _∂ p =  
 (1 + δ) (1 −  a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ ) ) 
  _____________________
2 +  (1 + δ) p (1 − 2 a ∗ )  =  
2 a ∗   _______________________   
p (2 +  (1 + δ) p (1 − 2 a ∗ ) ) , 
where the second equality holds because  F ( a ∗ ; p) = 0 implies  (1 + δ )(1 − 
 a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ )) = 2 a ∗ /p . Suppose  p and  δ are such that  a ∗ < 1/2 . Then, we have 
∂ a ∗ /∂ p <  a ∗ /p , and therefore the  left-hand side of (5) is positive when  a ∗ < 1/2 . 
From the equation  F ( a ∗ ; p) = 0 , we can verify that  a ∗ = 1/2 when  p = 2/3 
and  δ = 1 . Because  a ∗ increases in  p and  δ (Proposition 1),  q < p ≤ 2/3 
implies  b ∗ <  a ∗ < 1/2 for any  δ ≤ 1 .
This argument also shows that we must have  a ∗ > 1/2 whenever
  h ( a ∗ , p, δ) ≡ 2 (1 −  a ∗ ) − p (2 − p)  
 (1 + δ) (1 −  a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ ) ) 
  _____________________
2 +  (1 + δ) p (1 − 2  a ∗ )  = 0. 
For  a ∗ > 1/2 ,  h( a ∗ , p, δ ) is decreasing in  a ∗ ,  p , and  δ . By Proposition 1, this implies 
H( p, δ ) ≡ h( a ∗ ( p, δ ), p, δ ) is decreasing in  p and  δ . Thus, the locus  p –(δ ) that satisfies 
H(  p –(δ ), δ ) = 0 is decreasing in  δ , with  H( p, δ ) > 0 for all  p <  p –(δ ) . ∎
Proposition 3 states that a corroboration equilibrium exists whenever the standard 
of proof  ℓ ˆ falls in the range  (ℓ(r), ℓ(rR )] . Because  rr is more credible than  rR , and  r 
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is more credible than  rϕ , the accused agent  A will be arrested if and only if there are 
two reports lodged against him.
The range  (ℓ(r), ℓ(rR)] may be empty, in which case a corroboration equilibrium 
does not exist. This may occur because, for very high values of  p and  δ , the event  rR 
is even less credible than  r .21 The reason is that  rR reveals that the first accuser chose 
not to report right away. Because libelers are more likely to take this  wait-and-see 
approach, this brings down the belief, reflected in the ratio  (1 −  a ∗ )/(1 −  b ∗ ) . If 
both  p and  δ are close to  1 , then  1 −  a ∗ would be close to  0 , causing an undelayed 
report followed by a delayed report to be less credible than just one undelayed report.
Proposition 3 also establishes that the existence of a corroboration equi-
librium is guaranteed whenever  p or  δ is not too large. Specifically, for 
any  δ , a corroboration equilibrium always exists if  p ≤ 2/3 . Suppose, for exam-
ple, that  λ v =  λ l = 0.2 ,  p = 0.6 ,  q = 0.2 , and  δ = 1 . Then, in a corrobora-
tion equilibrium,  a ∗ = 0.41 and  b ∗ = 0.17 . In other words, about 59 percent 
of the new victims do not report the crimes against them immediately, and about 
83 percent of the potential libelers do not libel immediately. In such an equilibrium, 
 ℓ(rr) = 7.24 and  ℓ(rR) = 5.14 . A corroboration equilibrium exists if and only if 
ℓ ˆ ∈ (1.88, 5.14] . If victims and libelers were to always lodge a complaint imme-
diately (e.g., if they are  nonstrategic), the credibility of two undelayed reports 
would be  ℓ(rr) = p λ v /(q λ l ) = 3 . Thus, for  ℓ ˆ ∈ (3, 5.14] , agent  A would never 
get arrested if victims and libelers behaved  nonstrategically by always reporting 
immediately, but  A will be arrested with some probability in the corroborated equi-
librium of our model. More generally,  p ≤ 2/3 implies  a ∗ < 1/2 , and hence 
 a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ ) ≥  b ∗ (1 −  b ∗ ) . This ensures that  ℓ(rR) ≥ p λ v /(q λ l ) . The fact that, in a 
corroboration equilibrium, true victims are more likely to make allegations against  A 
than libelers are lends credence to such allegations.
If the existences of  V 1 and  V 2 are very positively correlated (e.g., when  p > 2/3 ), 
a corroboration equilibrium still exists when future costs and benefits are sufficiently 
discounted. This is because a lower  δ gives a new victim more incentive to wait and 
see and thus reduces  a ∗ to ensure that  ℓ(rR) > ℓ(r) . Specifically, when  δ ≤ 1/3 , 
we have  a ∗ ≤ 1/2 for any value of  p . This will guarantee that a corroboration equi-
librium exists.
The criminal justice system is imperfect and has to strike a balance between the 
possibilities of punishing the innocent (type I error) and letting go the guilty (type II 
error). In our model, type I error occurs because libelers wrongly accuse  A even 
though he has not broken the law. Given that there is at least one libeler, the prob-
ability that an innocent agent  A will be arrested in a corroboration equilibrium is:
(6)  Pr [type I] =  q _ 2 − q  (1 −  (1 −  b ∗ ) 2 ) , 
where the fraction is the probability that there are two potential libelers given that 
there is at least one, and the second term is the probability that at least one of  L 1 
21 For example, when  λ v =  λ l ,  p = 0.9 ,  q = 0.8 , and  δ = 0.95 , we have  a * = 0.69 and  b * = 0.59 . Then 
 ℓ(r) ≈ 1.07 > 0.99 = ℓ(rR) .
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and  L 2 has a reporting cost less than  b 
∗ (which will lead to two reports because 
the other one will follow up). Similarly, given that there is at least one victim, the 
probability that the evidence against a guilty agent  A does not reach the standard of 
proof in a corroboration equilibrium is:
(7)  Pr [type II] =  p _ 2 − p  (1 −  a ∗ ) 2 +  
2 (1 − p) 
 _
2 − p . 
The first term is the conditional probability that neither  V 1 nor  V 2 lodges a com-
plaint. The second term is the conditional probability that  A has hurt only one vic-
tim, so the evidence is not sufficient to reach the threshold regardless of whether the 
victim lodges a complaint or not.
PROPOSITION 4: In a corroboration equilibrium, the probability of type I error 
increases in  q and  δ , and the probability of type II error decreases in  p and  δ .
PROOF:
From equation (6), the probability of type I error increases in  q and in  b ∗ . 
Proposition 1 establishes that  b ∗ increases in  q and  δ . Therefore,  Pr[type I ] increases 
in  q δ . From equation (7),  Pr[type II ] decreases in  p and in  a ∗ . Because  a ∗ increases 
in  p and  δ ,  Pr[type II ] decreases in  p and  δ . ∎
An increase in the correlation of repeated offense  p by a guilty agent  A has two 
effects on the probability of his getting away without punishment. The first effect 
is mechanical: a higher  p raises the chance that there are two victims to report his 
crime. The second effect works through the response of the victims: a victim who 
expects the existence of another victim is more likely to report the crime through the 
encouragement effect. Both effects tend to reduce the probability of not having  A 
arrested.
In a corroboration equilibrium, new victims face a  trade-off between encourag-
ing others to report the crime and delaying to pay the cost of reporting. Greater 
patience  δ makes the latter option less attractive and hence increases the probabil-
ity that they report immediately. When people are more forthcoming in making an 
allegation against  A , the probability of type I error increases and the probability of 
type II error decreases.
III. Other Types of Equilibria
A. Other Equilibria with a Corroboration Flavor
In the previous section, we focus on corroboration equilibrium, in which agent  A 
is arrested if and only if there are two reports against him. The corroboration equi-
librium, provided that it exists, is not the only equilibrium in our model. Multiple 
equilibria exist because beliefs are  self-confirming. For example, if  rR does not 
lead to arrest, then no one has an incentive to make a delayed report. Because  rR 
does not occur in equilibrium in this case, we can assign  off-equilibrium beliefs 
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such that  rR is not credible enough to cause an arrest, hence confirming the equi-
librium construction. In this subsection, we consider two other types of equilibria 
in which corroboration is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for making an 
arrest. In the first type, agent  A is arrested only when both reports against him are 
undelayed. We call this an  rr -equilibrium. In the second type, agent  A is arrested 
only when one report is undelayed and the other is delayed. We call this an 
  rR -equilibrium.
In an  rr -equilibrium, the event  rR does not lead to an arrest. Therefore, a silent  V 1 
who has not reported in period 1 has no incentive to file a delayed report against  A 
upon learning that  V 2 has reported. Unlike in a corroboration equilibrium, we there-
fore have  α ˆ 1 (c) = 0 for all  c . Nevertheless, as in a corroboration equilibrium, we 
still have  α ̃ 1 (c) = 0 ( V 1 will not report in period 2 if no one reports against  A ) 
and  α ˆ 2 (c) = 1 ( V 2 will report if she learns that  V 1 has already made a report) in 
an  rr -equilibrium.
We continue to use  a to denote the probability of reporting right away by a new 
victim, and we will use  a rr to denote its equilibrium value. Likewise,  b rr is the equi-
librium probability of reporting immediately by a new libeler. In an  rr -equilibrium, 
reporting immediately gives a new victim a payoff of
  −c +  (1/2) p _______ 
1 − (1/2) pa  [δ ] . 
Not reporting gives her a payoff of  0 , as delaying the report will certainly lead to no 
arrest. The equilibrium probability of a new victim reporting right away when there 
is no prior report is the unique solution for  a to:
(8)  F rr (a; p) ≡  (1/2) p _______ 1 − (1/2) pa δ − a = 0. 
Comparing (8) to (4) in the previous section, we see that both the benefit from 
reporting immediately and the benefit from delaying to report are smaller in an 
 rr -equilibrium than in a corroboration equilibrium. Moreover, substituting the equi-
librium value of  a rr obtained from equation (8) and evaluating  F (a; p) from equa-
tion (4) at this value, we obtain
  F ( a rr ; p) =  1/2 _________  1 − (1/2) p a rr  [ p (1 −  a rr ) (1 − δ a rr ) ] > 0. 
This implies  a rr <  a ∗ , because  F ( ⋅ ; p) is  single crossing from above. Therefore, 
the overall effect of not allowing corroboration with delay as sufficient grounds for 
arrest is to discourage new victims from making a report immediately, as it removes 
the chance that an immediate report will encourage past victims who did not report 
to come forward by filing delayed reports.
Consider next an  rR -equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, because a second 
undelayed report will not lead to arrest, we have  α ˆ 2 (c) = 0 (whereas we still have 
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 α ˆ 1 (c) = 1 and  α ̃ 1 (c) = 0 , as in a corroboration equilibrium). The payoff to a new 
victim from reporting immediately is
  −c +  (1/2) p (1 − a)   _________
1 − (1/2) pa  [1] , 
which comes from the possibility that  V 1 exists but has not reported. On the other 




1 − (1/2) pa  [aδ (1 − c) ] , 
which comes from the possibility of reporting later if  V 2 exists and makes a report. 
Let  a rR be the equilibrium probability that a new victim reports immediately, and 
let  b rR be the equilibrium probability that a new libeler reports immediately. Then, 
 a rR is given by the unique solution for  a to the following equality:
(9)  F rR (a; p) ≡  (1/2) p (1 − a)   _________1 − (1/2) pa − a −  
(1/2) p
 _______ 
1 − (1/2) pa aδ (1 − a) = 0. 
Comparing (9) to the corresponding equation (4), which characterizes  a ∗ in a corrob-
oration equilibrium, because the payoff from reporting immediately is reduced but 
the payoff from not reporting remains unchanged, we have  a rR <  a ∗ .
PROPOSITION 5:
 (i ) There exists a  nonempty interval  ( ℓ _ rr ,  ℓ –rr ] such that an  rr -equilibrium exists 
if and only if  ℓ ˆ is in that interval. In this equilibrium,  b rr <  a rr <  a ∗ . 
Moreover,  ℓ –rr >  ℓ –∗ , and if  p ≤ 2/3 , then  ℓ _ rr >  ℓ _ ∗ .
 (ii ) There exists a  nonempty interval  (  ℓ _ rR ,  ℓ –rR ] such that an  rR -equilibrium exists 
if and only if  ℓ ˆ is in that interval. In this equilibrium,  b rR <  a rR <  a ∗ . 
Moreover,  ℓ –rR >  ℓ –∗ , and if  p ≤ 2/3 , then  ℓ _ rR >  ℓ _ ∗ .
The proof of Proposition 5 is in Appendix A. In both the  rr -equilibrium and the 
rR -equilibrium, new victims are less likely to report immediately compared with 
the case in a corroboration equilibrium. Furthermore, because  α ˆ 1 (c) = 0 in an 
 rr -equilibrium and  α ˆ 2 (c) = 0 in an  rR -equilibrium (these two quantities are both 
equal to  1 in a corroboration equilibrium), the overall probability that a victim or 
a libeler will make an allegation is lower compared with that in a corroboration 
equilibrium.
Compared with a corroboration equilibrium, an  rr -equilibrium and an 
 rR -equilibrium both reduce type I error but increase type II error, for two reasons: 
(i) each reduces the set of events under which  A is arrested, and (ii) the probability 
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that a new victim or new libeler will report immediately is lower. On the other hand, 
Proposition 5 also shows that arrests in an  rr -equilibrium or an  rR -equilibrium are 
more credible than the event  rR in a corroboration equilibrium (assuming  p is not 
too large). Thus, even if the standard of proof  ℓ ˆ is so high that a corroboration equi-
librium does not exist, it is still possible that the model will admit an  rr -equilibrium 
or an  rR -equilibrium.
The event  rR is off the equilibrium path in an  rr -equilibrium, and likewise for 
the event  rr in an  rR -equilibrium. Standard refinements are not sufficient to rule out 
these two types of equilibria. Nevertheless, because both event  rr and event  rR are 
observed in reality, we believe that the corroboration equilibrium is the most rele-
vant equilibrium to focus on, not  rr -equilibrium or  rR -equilibrium.
B. Lower Standard of Proof and  No-Corroboration Equilibrium
The probabilities of type I and type II errors can be affected by the standard of 
proof  ℓ ˆ. Consider the case where one report against agent  A is sufficient to lead to 
arrest. In such a case, no one will have an incentive to file a second report against 
the same person, so  rr and  rR are  off-equilibrium events. We call this type of equi-
librium a  no-corroboration equilibrium. The existence of a  no-corroboration equi-
librium requires  ℓ(r) ≥  ℓ ˆ and  ℓ(R) ≥  ℓ ˆ. Because the event  r is sufficient for arrest, 
the event  rϕ is irrelevant. We first assume that these conditions hold, and we subse-
quently verify that this is true for some values of  ℓ ˆ.
Suppose agent  A is guilty. If a victim of  A has seen a prior 
 accusation against him, there is no point for her to report because one 
report is  sufficient to punish  A . Therefore,  α ˆ 1 (c) =  α ˆ 2 (c) = 0 for 
all  c . On the other hand, if a silent victim  V 1 observes no one coming forward 
to complain against  A in period 2, she will make a delayed report because the 
event  R is  sufficient to lead to arrest. This means that we have  α ̃ 1 (c) = 1 in a 
no-corroboration equilibrium.
For a new victim (who does not see a prior accusation against  A ), the payoff from 
reporting immediately is  1 − c . The payoff from not reporting immediately is
(10)  1 − p _______ 
1 − (1/2) pa  [ 1 _2δ (1 − c) ] +  
(1/2) p
 _______ 
1 − (1/2) pa
  ×  [aδ +  (1 − a) δ (1 − c) ] +  (1/2) p (1 − a)   _________1 − (1/2) pa  [1] . 
The first fraction is the probability that another victim does not exist. Given this, 
there is probability  1/2 that she is  V 1 , in which case she lodges a delayed report at 
the end of period 2 and gets  δ(1 − c) . The second fraction is the conditional prob-
ability that this victim is  V 1 and  V 2 exists. With probability  a ,  V 2 reports the crime 
and  V 1 gets  δ , and with probability  1 − a ,  V 2 does not report the crime and  V 1 lodges 
a delayed report and gets  δ(1 − c) . The final term is the conditional probability 
that she is  V 2 and  V 1 exists but did not report. If she does not report,  V 1 will lodge a 
delayed report and  V 2 gets  1 .
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Let  f nc (c, a; p) represent the difference between  1 − c and (10), and define 
 F nc (a; p) ≡  f nc (a, a; p) . We have:
 F nc (a; p) =  1/2 _______ 1 − (1/2) pa  [ (1 − a) (2 − pa) 
 −  (1 − p) δ (1 − a) − pδ (1 − a (1 − a) ) − p (1 − a) ] . 
Because  F nc (0; p) > 0 >  F nc (1; p) and  F nc ( ⋅ ; p) is  single crossing from above, 
there exists a unique  a nc such that  F nc ( a nc ; p) = 0 . In a  no-corroboration equilib-
rium, the strategy of a new victim is  α(c) = 1 (i.e., report immediately) if and only 
if  c ≤  a nc . Similarly, the strategy of a libeler who sees no prior report against  A is β (c) = 1 if and only if  c ≤  b nc , where  F nc ( b nc ; q) = 0 .
PROPOSITION 6: A  no-corroboration equilibrium exists only if  ℓ ˆ <  λ v / λ l . 
Comparing the outcome in a  no-corroboration equilibrium to that in a corrobo-
ration equilibrium, the probability of convicting an innocent  A is higher, and the 
probability of acquitting a guilty  A is lower.
PROOF:
A  no-corroboration equilibrium exists if and only if the standard of proof is lower 
than the likelihood ratio corresponding to event  r or  R , i.e.,
  ℓ ˆ ≤ ℓ (r) = min {  λ v  a nc (2 − p a nc )   ______________ λ l  b nc (2 − q b nc ) ,    λ v (1 −  a nc ) (1 − p a nc )   ___________________ λ l (1 −  b nc ) (1 − q b nc ) } . 
Because  rr and  rR are  off-equilibrium events, we can assign  off-equilibrium beliefs 
such that  ℓ(rr) ≥  ℓ ˆ and  ℓ(rR) ≥  ℓ ˆ. Given these beliefs, there is no profitable devi-
ation from the strategy profile of a no-corroboration equilibrium. Note that  F nc (a; p) is 
 single crossing from above and is decreasing in  p . Hence,  p > q implies  a nc <  b nc . 
This implies that  a nc (2 − p a nc )/( b nc (2 − q b nc )) < 1 . Hence, a  no-corroboration 
equilibrium exists only if  ℓ ˆ ≤ ℓ(r) <  λ v / λ l .
If there are two libelers,  L 1 either makes an undelayed report or a delayed report 
in a  no-corroboration equilibrium. If there is only one libeler and this libeler is  L 2 , 
she makes an undelayed report with probability  b nc . Therefore, the overall probabil-




2 − q +  
2 (1 − q) 
 _
2 − q  ( 1 _2 +  1 _2  b nc ) , 
which is greater than (6). Similarly, the probability of type II error is
  
2 (1 − p) 
 _
2 − p  ( 1 _2(1 −  a nc ) ) , 
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which is less than (7). ∎
In a  no-corroboration equilibrium, there is no “encouragement effect” to moti-
vate a new victim to report immediately in order to induce a future or past victim 
to report. As a result, only the  freerider effect is present, and the  freerider effect is 
stronger the more likely that another victim exists. Hence a new victim has a higher 
incentive to freeride than a new libeler does and, as a result, reports with a lower 
probability. This implies that a  no-corroboration equilibrium exists only if the stan-
dard of proof  ℓ ˆ is so low that one will be arrested on the basis of a single report even 
if the victim and the libeler have the same pooling behavior (i.e., as if they were 
 nonstrategic). The advantage of having a lower standard of proof is that a guilty 
agent is more likely to be punished; the disadvantage is that it comes with a much 
higher chance of type I error.
There are other types of equilibria with a  no-corroboration flavor. In all 
such equilibria, agent  A is sometimes arrested when there is only one report 
(delayed or not) against him. In the first type, which we call an  r -equilibrium, 
agent  A is arrested in event  r but not in event  R . In the second type, which we call an 
 R -equilibrium, agent  A is arrested in event  R but not in event  r . The key features 
of these equilibria are quite similar to those for the  no-corroboration equilib-
rium described in Proposition 6. We summarize these features in the following 
proposition.
PROPOSITION 7: In an  r -equilibrium, new victims report immediately with a lower 
probability than do new libelers. In an  R -equilibrium, neither new victims nor new 
libelers ever report immediately. Each of these two types of equilibria exists only if 
the standard of proof  ℓ ˆ is below  λ v / λ l .
Allowing only one report to lead to arrest eliminates the encouragement effect 
for new victims to report immediately. Proposition 7 shows that an  r -equilibrium 
and an  R -equilibrium share the same feature that a victim reports right away with a 
lower probability than a libeler when there is no prior report. This adverse selection 
of accusers in turn implies that the standard of proof has to be so low (i.e., lower 
than  λ v / λ l ) that the public is willing to arrest someone knowing that a libeler is 
more active in reporting than a victim. Because such a standard of proof seems to us 
to be an implausibly low standard, and because we do observe multiple allegations 
( rr or  rR ) in reality, we choose to focus on the corroboration equilibrium in the 
remainder of this article.
IV. Model Extensions
We have made a number of modeling choices in the basic model to make it sim-
ple and transparent:  V 1 cannot make a delayed report in period 2 before  V 2 makes 
her decision, a guilty agent does not face potential libelers, agent  A is not strategic, 
and the victims and libelers have the same payoff structure. These restrictions can 
be relaxed without altering our main conclusions. We present the analysis in this 
section.
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A. Delay of the Initial Report
In our basic model, a delayed report is always preceded by an undelayed report 
in a corroboration equilibrium. In reality, sometimes even the first report against an 
accused is significantly delayed. For example, the first two allegations of sexual assault 
(almost simultaneously in 2016) against Larry Nassar, a former physician for the USA 
Gymnastics team, were delayed for 16 years and 17 years. The alleged crimes hap-
pened when the accusers were teenagers, so a large part of the periods of silence were 
spent when the accusers were adults. This means the delay had to do with something 
more than just the immaturity of the accusers. In this section, we show that the delay 
of the first report can be an equilibrium outcome if we also allow  V 1 to report in the 
second period before  V 2 can and if there is some discounting (i.e.,  δ < 1 ).
In Figure 2, we modify the timeline of the basic model by allowing  V 1 to have a 
chance to make a delayed report in period 2 before she learns about the existence of 
another report against  A . If  V 1 does not use this chance, she still has another chance 
to make a delayed report after  V 2 has her chance to report. The timeline for potential 
libelers is modified in a similar manner.
In this modified setting, if  V 1 reports in period 2 followed by  V 2 ’s report, we denote 
the event by  Rr . If  V 1 reports in period 2 and there is no report by  V 2 , we denote 
the event by  Rϕ . We will focus on a corroboration equilibrium in which agent  A is 
arrested if and only if there are two reports against him (i.e., in the events  rr ,  rR , 
or  Rr ).
By the time of the second period,  V 1 already knows that she is  V 1 . If she has 
not yet reported, by reporting in period 2, she will get payoff  p − c because with 
probability  p ,  V 2 exists and will follow up with a report. By not reporting in period 
2,  V 1 will get  pa(1 − c) because  V 2 will report with probability  a , after which  V 1 can 
follow up with a report. Therefore, the cutoff type (denoted  c ˆ2 ) of  V 1 , who is indif-
ferent between reporting and not reporting in period 2 before  V 2 ’s turn to report, is 
determined by  p −  c ˆ2 = pa(1 −  c ˆ2 ) , which gives
  c ˆ2 (a, p) =  p (1 − a)  _1 − pa . 
Figure 2: The Modified Timeline When  A Is Guilty
Notes: Victim  V 1 can make a delayed report in period 2 before knowing whether  V 2 reports or not. If  V 2 reports,  V 1 











Period 1 Period 2
Report 
by V1
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Any  V 1 whose cost is below  c ˆ2 (a, p) will report in period 2 if she has not reported 
before. For the case where  A is innocent,  L 1 whose cost is below  c ˆ2 (b, q) = q(1 − b)/(1 − qb) will report in period 2 if she has not reported before.
There are two cases to consider: (i)  c ˆ2 (a, p) ≥ a , and (ii)  c ˆ2 (a, p) < a . However, 
only case (i) is relevant;22 we therefore focus on case (i). In this case, some types of 
victim with  c ∈ (a,  c ˆ2 (a, p)] will choose not to report immediately but rather wait 
until period 2 to lead with a delayed report.
Consider a new victim who has not seen a prior report. The expected net payoff 
from reporting immediately is:
   
1 − p
 _____________  
1 − (1/2) p c ˆ2 (a, p)  [−c] +  
(1/2) p
 ____________  
1 − (1/2)p c ˆ2 (a, p)  [δ − c] 
 +  (1/2) p (1 −  c ˆ2 (a, p) )   _______________
1 − (1/2) p c ˆ2 (a, p)   [1 − c] . 
Her expected net payoff from not reporting immediately is:
  
1 − p
 _____________  
1 − (1/2) p  c ˆ2 (a, p)  [− 
1 _
2
δc] +  (1/2) p  _____________  1 − (1/2) p c ˆ2 (a, p)  [δ (1 − c) ] . 
The first term above refers to the situation where another victim does not exist. 
Given this, there is probability  1/2 that the new victim is  V 1 , in which case she will 
make a delayed report in period 2 if her cost is  c <  c ˆ2 (a, p) .
By the same logic as in the basic model, the equilibrium probability that a new 
victim will report immediately, denoted  a del , is the solution in  a to the following 
equation:
 F del (a; p) ≡  1 / 2 _______________  1 − (1 / 2)p c ˆ2 (a, p) [−a (2 − δ − p c ˆ2 (a, p) ) + p (1 −  c ˆ2 (a, p) ) ] = 0. 
It is straightforward to show that a unique  a del ∈ (0, 1) exists, and that  a del 
increases in  p and  δ .
PROPOSITION 8: Suppose  V 1 can make a delayed report in period 2 
before  V 2 has her chance to report. Then, in a corroboration equilibrium, (i) if 
c ≤  a del , then  V 1 reports immediately in period  1 ; (ii) if  c ∈ ( a del ,  c ˆ2 ( a del , p)] , 
then  V 1 makes a delayed report in period 2 before  V 2 has her chance to report; and (iii) if  c >  c ˆ2 ( a del , p) , then  V 1 makes a delayed report in period 2 if and only if she 
observed that  V 2 has reported. Compared with the corroboration equilibrium in the 
basic model,  a del <  a ∗ <  c ˆ2 ( a del , p) when  δ < 1 .
22 In case (i),  c > a implies  c >  c ˆ2 (a, p) . Any type who does not report immediately when she is a new vic-
tim will choose to wait in period 2 rather than leading with a delayed report. Then the condition that determines 
the equilibrium value of  a is the same as in the basic model, i.e.,  a satisfies  F(a; p) = 0 . But because  δ < 1 , 
 F(a; p) = 0 implies  p(1 − a +  a 2 ) > a , which contradicts  c ˆ2 (a, p) ≤ a .
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PROOF:
Suppose  δ = 1 . Then the option for  V 1 to make a delayed report before knowing 
whether  V 2 has reported or not has no value to  V 1 because there is no discounting. This 
implies  a del =  c ˆ2 ( a del , p) =  a ∗ for  δ = 1 . Now,  a del −  c ˆ2 ( a del , p) is increasing in  δ 
because  a del increases in  δ . Thus,  a del −  c ˆ2 ( a del , p) < 0 for all  δ < 1 . Furthermore, 
because  c ˆ2 ( a del , p) decreases in  δ whereas  a ∗ increases in  δ , we have  c ˆ2 ( a del , p) >  a ∗ 
for all  δ < 1 .
For any  δ < 1 , the condition  F del ( a del ; p) = 0 can be written as:
  −a (2 − p  c ˆ2 ( a del , p) ) + δ a del + p (1 −  c ˆ2 ( a del , p) ) = 0. 
The fact that  c ˆ2 ( a del , p) >  a del implies
  −a (2 − p a del ) + δ a del + p (1 −  a del ) > 0. 
Moreover,  c ˆ2 (a, p) > a if and only if  a < p(1 − a +  a 2 ) . This implies that
  −a (2 − p a del ) + p δ (1 −  a del +  a del 2 ) + p (1 −  a del ) > 0, 
which is equivalent to  F( a del ; p) > 0 . As  F( ⋅ ; p) is  single crossing from above, we 
obtain  a del <  a ∗ . ∎
This corroboration equilibrium exists if and only if
  max {ℓ (r) , ℓ (Rϕ) , ℓ (rϕ) } < min {ℓ (rr) , ℓ (Rr) , ℓ (rR) } . 
For example, when  λ v =  λ l ,  p = 0.3 ,  q = 0.1 , and  δ = 0.8 , we have  a del = 0.20 , 
 c ˆ2 (a del , p) = 0.26 ,  b del = 0.076 , and  c ˆ2 ( b del , q) = 0.09 . In this case,  max{ℓ(r), ℓ(Rϕ), ℓ(rϕ)} = ℓ(r) = 2.89 and  min{ℓ(rr), ℓ(Rr), ℓ(rR)} = ℓ(Rr) = 30.18 . 
Therefore,  ℓ(r) < ℓ(Rr) , and the corroboration equilibrium exists for  ℓ ˆ ∈ (ℓ(r), 
ℓ(Rr)] . Compared with the basic model in which  a ∗ = 0.22 and  b ∗ = 0.08 ,  V 1 (or  L 1 ) 
in the basic model is less likely to report in period 1 but is more likely to have 
reported in period 2 before  V 2 (or  L 2 ) chooses to report.
B. Guilty One Faces Both Victims and Libelers
It is natural that libelers may exist not just for an innocent agent but also for a 
guilty one. In this subsection, we assume that both the guilty and the innocent agent 
face the same chance of having potential libelers, but the guilty one also faces an 
additional chance of accusation by victims. We show that this difference alone can 
generate differences in reporting behavior between victims and libelers to produce 
 semiseparation between guilty and innocent types, so here we remove recidivism 
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as a force for  semiseparation by assuming independent probabilities of existence of 
potential reporters across two periods.
Suppose that, in each period independently, a guilty agent  A has probability  x of 
facing a victim, probability  y of facing a libeler, and probability  1 − x − y of facing 
neither a victim nor a libeler. On the other hand, an innocent agent has probability  y 
of facing a libeler and probability  1 − y of not facing a libeler (an innocent agent 
never faces a victim). We assume that these events are independent across periods.23 
Let  a denote the probability that a new victim reports immediately and  b denote the 
probability that a new libeler reports immediately. The common prior that the state 
is guilty is  μ 0 .
We study a corroboration equilibrium again. For the purpose of comparing with 
the basic model, we let  p = x + y in this section. Also let  a E be the expected prob-
ability of reporting of the other potential accuser (given her existence) from the 
perspective of a victim, i.e.,
(11)  a E =  x _ x + y a +  y _ x + y b. 
Then, a new victim can entertain three possibilities: (i) another accuser does not 
exist (with probability  1 − p ), (ii) she is  V 1 and another accuser exists (with proba-
bility  (1/2) p ), or (iii) she is  V 2 and another accuser existed but did not report (with 
probability  (1/2) p  a E ). Her payoff from reporting immediately is:
  −c +  (1/2) p _________  
1 − (1/2) p a E  [δ ] +  
(1/2) p (1 −  a E ) 
  __________
1 − (1/2) p  a E   [1] . 
Her payoff from not reporting immediately is:
  
(1/2) p
 _________  
1 − (1/2) p a E  [ a E δ (1 − c) ] . 
This implies that the equilibrium probability of reporting by a new victim must satisfy:
(12)  f both (a,  a E , p) ≡ −a +  (1/2) p ________  1 − (1/2) p a E δ (1 −  a E (1 − a) ) +  
(1/2) p (1 −  a E ) 
  __________
1 − (1/2) p a E  
 = 0 .
A new libeler does not know the state. Since both states give rise to the same 
probability of a libeler, a new libeler uses prior  μ 0 . Again, for comparison with the 
basic model, we let  q =  μ 0 x + y in this section. Also let  b E be the expected prob-
ability of reporting of the other accuser (given that she exists) from the perspective 
of a libeler, i.e.,
(13)  b E =   μ 0 x _  μ 0 x + y a +  
y
 _  μ 0 x + y b. 
23 We purposefully use independent probabilities here to show that correlation is not needed for this model 
extension. The mere fact that  x > 0 can generate different behavior between the victims and libelers.
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A similar argument shows that the equilibrium probability of reporting by a new 
libeler must satisfy:
(14)  f both (b,  b E , q) = −b +  (1/2) q _________  1 − (1/2) q b E δ (1 −  b E (1 − b) ) +  
(1/2) q (1 −  b E ) 
  __________
1 − (1/2) q b E  
 = 0. 
The equilibrium  a both and  b both are solutions in  a and  b to the system of four equa-
tions: (11), (12), (13), and (14).
PROPOSITION 9: In a corroboration equilibrium in which a guilty agent may 
face both victims and libelers,  a both >  b both . Moreover,  ℓ(rr) > ℓ(rR) in this 
equilibrium.
PROOF:
Suppose to the contrary that  a both ≤  b both . Note from equations (11) and (13) 
that the equilibrium  a E 
∗ and  b E ∗ are weighted averages of  a both and  b both and that  a E 
puts more weight on  a both than does  b E . This implies  a both ≤  a E ∗ ≤  b E ∗ ≤  b both . 
The function  f both (a,  a E , p) is decreasing in  a , decreasing in  a E , and increasing in  p . 
Note also that  p = x + y >  μ 0 x + y = q . Therefore,
  0 =  F both ( a both ,  a E ∗ , p) >  F both ( b both ,  b E ∗ , q) = 0. 
This forms a contradiction.
We have established that  a both >  b both , which in turn implies 
that  a both >  a E ∗ >  b E ∗ >  b both . The likelihood ratios of the events  rr and  rR are, 
respectively:
  ℓ (rr) =   p 
2  a E 
∗
 _ 
 y 2  b both 
; ℓ (rR) =   p 
2  a E 
∗(1 −  a E ∗) 
  _______________  
 y 2  b both (1 −  b both ) . 
Therefore,  a E 
∗ >  b both and  p > y imply  ℓ(rr) > ℓ(rR) . ∎
Here, a victim and a libeler both expect there to be the same chance of another 
potential libeler in another period. But a victim’s private information tells her that 
the chance of a true victim being out there is higher than what an uninformed libeler 
thinks. Therefore, the encouragement effect is stronger for a victim than for a libeler, 
and the main results carry through: a new victim leads with a higher probability 
than a new libeler, and a delayed report is met with suspicion in a corroboration 
equilibrium.
C. Strategic Agent
In the basic model, the guilty agent is  nonstrategic and commits crimes accord-
ing to exogenous probabilities. We can endogenize the existence of victims 
by  letting the guilty agent strategically choose whether and when to commit a 
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crime to gain some benefit. Likewise, an innocent agent can strategically choose 
whether and when to avoid offending at a cost and thus prevent having to face 
potential libelers.
We will capture the difference between the criminal and the innocent agent in 
the following way: the criminal has a benefit of crime that is persistent over the 
two periods—a criminal who gains a high benefit from a crime will still gain a high 
benefit in the next period from another crime. This captures another aspect of the 
tendency for perpetrators of sexual crimes to engage in repeat offenses. In contrast, 
we assume that the cost for an innocent agent to avoid being libeled is independent 
across the two periods. We show that this simple difference can drive the same main 
result of  semiseparation in the reporters’ behavior.
Consider first the behavior of a criminal agent. In each period, the criminal agent  A 
chooses whether or not to commit a crime. Suppose his benefit from committing 
each crime is  π , which is distributed uniformly on the interval  [0, 1] but is persistent 
over the two periods, and his cost of being arrested is  1 . For this extension, we will 
focus on characterizing the corroboration equilibrium. We continue to denote a new 
victim’s expected probability of reporting immediately by  a .
If a crime was not committed in period 1, then  A will surely commit a crime 
in period 2 because one report cannot get him arrested. If a crime was commit-
ted in period 1 and  V 1 has reported,  A has no incentive to commit another crime 
in period 2, because  V 2 upon seeing a previous report will surely report, and two 
reports will cause  A to be arrested.
Now consider the subgame where a crime was committed in period 1 but  V 1 did 
not report in period 1. If  A decides to commit the crime again in period 2, he gets 
payoff  π − a . This is because  V 2 , as a new victim, will report with probability  a , 
after which  V 1 will follow with a report that will get  A arrested. If  A does not commit 
the crime, his payoff is  0 . Therefore, he commits the crime in period 2 if and only 
if  π > a .
Going backward to period 1, the payoff from committing a crime in period 1 is
  π +  (1 − a) δ max {π − a, 0} . 
Here,  1 − a is the probability that  V 1 does not report, which gives him a chance 
to commit a crime again in period 2. His payoff from not committing a crime in 
period 1 is  δ π , reflecting that he can commit a crime in the future with impunity 
because a single report from  V 2 is not enough to get him arrested. Thus  A will surely 
commit a crime in period 1.
Consider the incentive of a new victim. She entertains two possibilities:
 (i) She is  V 1 . If she reports, there will be no more crime. The cost of reporting is  c 
. If she does not report, then with probability  1 − a , the crime will be repeated 
and  V 2 will report with probability  a , which she can then follow with a report.
 (ii) She is  V 2 . A previous victim must exist but was silent. If she reports,  V 1 will 
follow with her report. The payoff is  1 − c . If she does not report, the payoff 
is  0 .
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Conditional on her own existence and the silence so far, the probabil-
ity of her being  V 1 is  1/(1 +  (1 − a) 2 ) , and the probability of her being  V 2 is 
 (1 − a) 2 /(1 +  (1 − a) 2 ) . The payoff difference between reporting immediately and 
not doing so is:
  f g (c, a) =  1 ___________ 1 +  (1 − a) 2 [−c −  (1 − a) aδ (1 − c) ] +  
 (1 − a) 2 
 ___________  
1 +  (1 − a) 2 [1 − c] . 
For any  a ,  f g ( ⋅ ,  a) is strictly decreasing, with  f g (0, a) > 0 >  f g (1, a) . Therefore, 
there exists  c ˆg (a) satisfying  f g ( c ˆg (a), a) = 0 such that the best response is to report 
immediately if and only if  c ≤  c ˆg (a) . The equilibrium of reporting by a new victim, 
denoted  a g , is the solution to:
(15)  F g (a) ≡  f g (a, a) =  1 ___________ 1 +  (1 − a) 2 [−a +  (1 − a) 
2 (1 − a − aδ) ] = 0. 
Next, we consider the behavior of an innocent agent. In each period, there is a 
person with the intention to libel (a libeler). For example, a professor can see that a 
student is failing his class because of poor performance, or a boss is firing a worker 
because of tardiness. When a libeler exists, the innocent agent  A can exercise cau-
tion to avoid being libeled. For example, the professor can avoid meeting the stu-
dent alone in the office, or even bend the rules to let that student pass despite poor 
performance. To exercise caution (or to bend the rules), there is a cost  γ 1 in period 1 
and  γ 2 in period 2. We assume that  γ 1 and  γ 2 are distributed uniformly over  [0, 1] and 
independently across two periods. We will just call the action “exercising caution” 
(which includes bending the rules) for simplicity. Exercising caution removes any 
grounds for the libeler to make a complaint against  A .
If caution was exercised in period 1, then  A will not exercise caution in period 2. 
If caution was not exercised in period 1 and  L 1 has reported, then  A will exercise 
caution in period 2. If caution was not exercised in period 1 but  L 1 has not reported, 
then  A exercises caution in period 2 if and only if  γ 2 < b .
Going back to period 1, if  A exercises caution, he does not have to do so in the 
future, so the payoff is  − γ 1 . On the other hand, if  A does not exercise caution in 
period 1, there are two possibilities. (i) If  L 1 libels in period 1,  A will definitely 
exercise caution, paying a cost  E[ γ 2 ] . (ii) If  L 1 does not libel in period 1,  A will 
make a decision in period 2 based on his  period 2 cost of exercising caution, paying 
a cost  E[min{ γ 2 , b}] . Therefore, the expected payoff from not exercising caution in 
period 1 is:
  −δ (bE [ γ 2 ] +  (1 − b) E [min { γ 2 , b} ] ) = −  
δb (3 − b) 
 _
2
 ≡ − q 1 (b) . 
In period 1,  A will exercise caution if and only if  − γ 1 > − q 1 (b) . Since  γ 1 is uni-
formly distributed on  [0, 1] ,  L 1 exists with probability  q 1 (b) .
A new potential libeler knows that there are three possibilities when she sees no 
prior report:
 (i) She is  L 1 . This happens with probability  (1/2)  q 1 (b) . If she reports, there will 
be no more potential libeler (thus no more report) in the future. Her payoff 
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would be  −c . If she does not report, with probability  1 − b (the probability 
that  γ 2 > b ), there is  L 2 in the future who will report with probability  b . Her 
payoff would be  (1 − b)bδ(1 − c) .
 (ii) She is  L 2 and  L 1 exists but did not report. This happens with probability (1/2)  q 1 (b) (1 − b) 2 , since it requires  γ 1 <  q 1 (b) ,  γ 2 > b , and  L 1 not to 
report. In this case, if  L 2 reports,  L 1 will follow and  A will be arrested. The 
payoff for  L 2 would be  1 − c . If she does not report,  A will not be arrested. 
The payoff would be  0 .
 (iii) She is  L 2 and  L 1 does not exist. This event happens with probability 
 (1/2)(1 −  q 1 (b)) . The payoff to  L 2 would be  −c if she reports, and  0 if she 
does not.
Let  f i (c, b) represent the payoff difference between reporting immediately and not 
doing so, which is given by:
     
 q 1 (b) 
 ________________  
1 +  q 1 (b) (1 − b) 2 [−c −  (1 − b) bδ (1 − c) ] 
   +   q 1 (b) (1 − b) 
2 
  ________________  
1 +  q 1 (b) (1 − b) 2 [1 − c] +  
1 −  q 1 (b) 
  ________________  
1 +  q 1 (b) (1 − b) 2 [−c] . 
For any  b ,  f i ( ⋅ , b) is strictly decreasing, so there exists a critical level of reporting 
cost below which a new libeler will make an accusation. The equilibrium probability 
of reporting by a new libeler, denoted  b i , is the solution to:
(16)  F i (b) ≡  f i (b, b) =  1 ________________ 1 +  q 1 (b) (1 − b) 2 [−b +  q 1 (b) (1 − b) 
2 (1 − b − bδ) ] 
 = 0. 
We are now in the position to show that  a g >  b i . Note that  F i (b) is  single cross-
ing from above in  b . Therefore, it is sufficient to show that  F i ( a g ) < 0 . From equa-
tions (15) and (16), we have
  F i ( a g ) =  1 _________________ 1 +  q 1 ( a g ) (1 −  a g ) 2 [− (1 −  q i ( a g ) )  a g ] < 0. 
This establishes that  a g >  b i . The intuition is that  V 2 knows for sure 
that  V 1 exists, but  L 2 does not know for sure that  L 1 exists. As in the basic 
model, the higher belief that one’s report will be corroborated raises the 
 encouragement effect to cause a new victim to break the silence with a greater 
probability.
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D. Possible Payoff Differences
Different payoff assumptions about victims and libelers would have predicable 
implications for the results. To this end, we derive comparative statics results with 
respect to the cost and benefit of reporting. This exercise also serves to demonstrate 
that the assumption that reporting costs are uniformly distributed is not essential for 
our model.
Suppose the distribution of reporting cost is given by  G(c; κ) on the support  [0, 1] . 
Here, an increase in  κ represents a  first-order stochastic increase in reporting cost. 
Suppose the benefit of getting the accused arrested is  ρ > 0 . In a corroboration 
equilibrium, if the strategy is for a new victim to lodge a complaint against  A if 
and only if her reporting cost is lower than some critical value  c ˆ, then  a = E [α(c)] 
= G( c ˆ; κ) . Whenever it is interior, the critical type  c ˆ is indifferent between report-
ing immediately and not doing so. Therefore, the equilibrium value of  a for victims 
satisfies the indifference condition:
  f ( c ˆ, a; p) =  1/2 _________ 1 − (1/2) pa  [− c ˆ(2 − pa) + pδ (ρ − a (ρ −  c ˆ) ) + p (ρ − a) ] = 0, 
where  c ˆ =  G −1 (a; κ) . This payoff difference is  single crossing from above in  a . 
Moreover, a higher  κ raises  G −1 (a; κ) for any  a . Because the payoff difference 
decreases in  G −1 (a; κ) , the equilibrium value  a ∗ must fall as  κ increases. Not sur-
prisingly, a stochastic increase in reporting cost causes people to be less forthcom-
ing in making an allegation. Similarly, it is straightforward to show that  a ∗ increases 
in  ρ , i.e., a higher benefit from having the accused arrested causes people to be more 
forthcoming in making an allegation.
We can apply this comparative statics result to study differences in costs or bene-
fits between victims and libelers. For example, in practice libelers may face the pos-
sibility of being discovered as libelers and may suffer negative consequences as a 
result. This can be incorporated as a higher cost of reporting than for the true victims. 
Assume that the distributions of reporting cost for victims and libelers are  G(c;  κ v ) 
and  G(c;  κ l ) , respectively, with  κ l >  κ v . Our analysis would predict that  a ∗ >  b ∗ 
even if  p = q . In this case, the model would be similar to that in Chandrasekhar, 
Golub, and Yang (2018), in which  semiseparation of victims from libelers is driven 
by differences in the distribution of reporting costs.
Alternatively, one can imagine that libelers may be partly motivated by private 
compensation, so that they can get a benefit even if the accused is not arrested. If we 
model the possibility of private compensation as a stochastic reduction in reporting 
cost for libelers (but not for victims), then this will suggest that  κ l <  κ v , which has 
the effect of raising  b ∗ relative to  a ∗ , which in turn has the effect of reducing the 
credibility of crime allegations.
E. Other Extensions
Our model can be modified in other directions. We show that the correlation 
structure in the basic model can be replaced by the assumption that the existence 
of victims (or libelers) in the two periods is independent across time, provided that 
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the probability of having a potential accuser in each period is greater for the guilty 
type than for the innocent type. Several extensions would not alter the main results 
of the paper, such as (i) allowing the reporters to know which period they are in and 
(ii) allowing more victims than just two. We describe these extensions more fully in 
Appendix B.
V. Callisto Reporting System
An online sexual assault reporting system called Callisto had been adopted by 
eight universities by late 2017. This reporting system allows a student to log a 
report into the system under the precondition that it will be released to the school 
only if another student names the same perpetrator, an option called “match.” The 
system also allows reporting to the school authority directly, but the system does 
not allow any potential reporter to see other reports in the system. The  nonprofit 
organization that founded this system believes that sexual assault is prevalent on 
campus, that the reporting rate is low, and that repeat offenders are not stopped.24 
The Callisto reporting system falls under the definition of an “information escrow” 
in Ayres and Unkovic (2012), because Callisto allows people to transmit informa-
tion to it under seal and have the information forwarded only under  prespecified 
conditions.25
In this section, we examine the outcome assuming that a school uses Callisto as 
the reporting channel. Other assumptions maintained in the basic model are kept the 
same. The action choice for the school is to investigate and discipline the accused 
or not. We assume that an infinitesimally small cost is incurred when one enters a 
report into the system, and cost  c is incurred when the report is submitted to the 
school authority because only then is the potentially unflattering conduct of the 
accuser known, and only then does the emotionally exhausting investigation begin.
The Callisto system can potentially create three distinguishable events at the 
school in our  two-period setup: (i) no report (denoted  ϕ ), (ii) two reports and both 
are not delayed ( r r ), and (iii) two reports and one is delayed ( r R ). Any time only one 
report is in the system, the system shows no report to the school. To give reporters 
strict incentive to report, either  rr or  rR should lead to an investigation and possibly 
to disciplinary action. For there to be an interesting issue, no report from the Callisto 
system should lead to no action by the school. We focus on the corroboration equi-
librium, in which both  rr and  rR cause the school to take investigative or disciplinary 
action. This requires  ℓ ˆ ≤ ℓ(rr) and  ℓ ˆ ≤ ℓ(rR) .
First, observe that for a victim or a libeler, using the “match” option is better 
than reporting directly to the school through the Callisto system. If there is already 
another corroborating report, then it makes no difference. If there has not been 
one,  then using the “match” option can avoid wasting the reporting cost or can 
24 See the Callisto website, https://www.projectcallisto.org/what-we-do. 
25 Sometimes, journalists perform a role that is similar to an information escrow. They do not publish a story 
until they have gathered a few allegations from different sources. For example, the New York Times broke the story 
on Harvey Weinstein in October 2017 after gathering allegations from multiple women. The accusers were not 
paying the cost of publicly accusing Weinstein until several pieces of corroboration were available and the news 
article was published.
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delay  the reporting cost if the corroborating report comes in the future. Second, 
logging the complaint into the system right away is better than waiting to log it 
later, as long as the chance of having a corroborator is not infinitesimally small. 
Therefore, in any corroboration equilibrium, a victim or a libeler logs the com-
plaint into Callisto with no delay. This means that the event  rr occurs with 
probability  p λ v if the accused is guilty, or with probability  q λ l if the accused is 
innocent.
On the equilibrium path, the reports are submitted to the school only when the 
event is  rr . The likelihood ratio corresponding to this event is  ℓ(rr) = p λ v /q λ l . For 
this event to be sufficient for the school to take action, we must have  ℓ ˆ ≤ p λ v /q λ l . 
As long as there are not two reporters, there is no alert to the school authority:  ϕ . The 
likelihood ratio corresponding to this event is  ℓ(ϕ) = (1 − p λ v )/(1 − q λ l ) , which 
has to be less than  ℓ ˆ in a corroboration equilibrium. Because  rR is  off equilibrium, 
we can assign an  off-equilibrium belief such that  ℓ ˆ ≤ ℓ(rR) . This establishes the 
following result.
PROPOSITION 10: Under a Callisto reporting system, a corroboration equilibrium 
exists if and only if
  ℓ ˆ ∈  ( ℓ _ Cal ,  ℓ –Cal ] ≡  ( 1 − p λ v  _1 − q λ l ,   
p λ v  _
q λ l ] . 
This interval is nonempty as long as  p λ v > q λ l . Because of the stronger incentive 
to report for both victims and libelers, the equilibrium probability of reporting imme-
diately satisfies  a Cal = 1 >  a ∗ and  b Cal = 1 >  b ∗ . However, because  a Cal =  b Cal 
whereas  a ∗ >  b ∗ , two reports ( rr ) from the Callisto system do not carry the same 
level of credibility as two reports ( rr ) without the Callisto system. In fact, two reports 
( rr ) in the Callisto system may even carry less credibility than the event  rR without 
the Callisto system if  p is not very large. If  p ≤ 2/3 , then  ℓ(rR) in the basic model is 
greater than  ℓ –Cal . Therefore, if  p ≤ 2/3 and  ℓ ˆ ∈ ( ℓ –Cal ,  ℓ –∗ ] , the standard of proof is so 
high that victims have no incentive to pay the infinitesimally small cost of lodging a 
complaint, knowing that even two reports are not sufficient to cause the school to take 
action under the Callisto system. In contrast, the same standard of proof will induce a 
positive equilibrium probability of reporting  a ∗ without the Callisto system. In other 
words, adopting the Callisto system can potentially backfire if maintaining credibility 
of allegations is a serious concern.
VI. Conclusion
Allegations about sexual crimes and misconduct can be difficult to handle 
because they often leave behind no physical evidence. Victims usually do not have 
hard evidence to prove the existence of the crime, which gives libelers ample 
opportunities to fake as victims. This article shows that, despite this difficulty, 
allegations without hard evidence have a certain level of credibility. First, an alle-
gation proves the existence of an individual who has the intention of either a 
victim or a libeler. This fact alone may carry some credibility if the probability of 
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existence of such potential allegation makers is larger for a true criminal than for 
an innocent person. Second, the tendency of sexual criminals to repeatedly offend 
gives a victim more confidence about the existence of another potential corrobo-
rator than it gives a libeler. As a result, in a corroboration equilibrium, a victim is 
more motivated to encourage other potential corroborators by leading with a first 
report against the accused than a libeler is against an innocent person. This differ-
ence in equilibrium behavior boosts the credibility of an undelayed report while 
reducing the credibility of a  follow-up report that alleges a crime that occurred a 
long time ago.
The decision maker who handles crime allegations in our model is the police 
and the prosecution team, who can take into account the entire history of reports to 
reach a decision of whether to search, arrest, or prosecute. For cases of less severe 
sexual harassment, the decision maker may be the human resources department 
of the employer, which may also use Bayesian inference to reach a decision on 
whether the accused should be punished or not. It also applies to the decision of 
the trial judge or jury whenever “prior bad acts” are admissible under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, whether as an exception to Rule 404, under Rule 406 to estab-
lish a habit, or under Rules 413 through 415, all of which are adopted by most 
states (Reed 1993).
Absent in our model are the settlement between the accused and the accuser and 
the confidentiality clauses typical in settlement agreements. These clearly played a 
role in the suppression of some public allegations of crimes and misconduct. Neither 
do we consider fully the possible behavioral responses by the agent being accused. 
In the main model, we simply assume that the agent’s behavior is  nonstrategic. 
In Section IVC, we present an extension in which an agent strategically decides 
whether to engage in a crime. Nevertheless, he always chooses to commit the first 
crime because one allegation is not sufficient to lead to an arrest. More realistically, 
there are significant costs to an agent when he is publicly accused, such as loss of 
reputation, even if the accusation does not constitute sufficient evidence to cause an 
arrest. A public allegation may also cause other potential victims to take more cau-
tion against the agent. Our extended model does not fully capture these deterrence 
effects arising from crime allegations. Incorporating these more realistic features 
into our model is an agenda for further research.
Appendix
A. Omitted Proofs
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
Take the derivative of  f (c, a; p) in equation (3) with respect to  a to get
  
∂ f
 _ ∂ a =  
(1/2) p
 _______ 
1 − (1/2) pa  [ f (c, a; p) − δ (1 − c) −  (1 − c) ] , 
which is negative because  f (c, a; p) < 1 − c . ∎
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PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
Take the derivative of equation (3) with respect to  p to get
  
∂ f
 _ ∂ p =  1 _______ 1 − (1/2) pa  [  1 _2 af (c, a; p) + c +  1 _2(δ − c − aδ (1 − c) ) 
 +  1 _
2(1 − a) (1 − c) ] 
  >  (1/2) a _______ 
1 − (1/2) pa  [  f (c, a; p) + c + δ (1 − a (1 − c) ) +  (1 − a) (1 − c) ] , 
which is positive because  f (c, a; p) > −c . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
(i) We have shown in the text that  a rr <  a ∗ . Note also that  b rr satisfies 
 F rr ( b rr ; q) = 0 . Because  F rr (a; p) is  single crossing from above in  a and increasing 
in  p ,  q < p implies  b rr <  a rr .
In an  rr -equilibrium, event  rr occurs with probability  p  λ v  a rr . The corre-
sponding likelihood ratio is  ℓ(rr) = p  λ v  a rr /(q  λ l  b rr ) . Two events lead to 
the event  r . Either the current period is period 1 and  V 1 reports (this happens 
with probability  (1/2) λ v  a rr ), or the current period is period 2 and  V 1 either 
did not exist or did not report while  V 2 reports (this happens with probabil-
ity  (1/2)(1 − p a rr ) λ v  a rr ). Therefore,  ℓ (r) =  λ v (2 − p a rr )  a rr /( λ l (2 − q b rr )  b rr ) . 
Substituting  a rr = pδ/(2 − p a rr ) and  b rr = qδ/(2 − q b rr ) , we obtain  ℓ(r) = p λ v /q  λ l . Therefore, an  rr -equilibrium exists if
  ℓ ˆ ∈  ( ℓ _ rr ,  ℓ –rr ] ≡  ( p λ v  _q λ l ,   
p λ v  a rr  _
q λ l  b rr ] . 
The event  rϕ occurs when  V 1 exists and makes a report but  V 2 does not exist. The 
corresponding likelihood ratio is  ℓ(rϕ) =  λ v (1 − p)  a rr /( λ l (1 − q)  b rr ) <  ℓ _ rr . The 
events  R and  rR are  off equilibrium, and we can assign off-equilibrium beliefs such 
that their corresponding likelihood ratios are below the standard of proof.
Because  a rr >  b rr , it is obvious that the interval  ( ℓ _ rr ,  ℓ –rr ] is  nonempty. To estab-
lish that  ℓ – rr >  ℓ – ∗ , we show
  
 a rr  _
 b rr 
>   a 
∗ (1 −  a ∗ ) 
 _
 b ∗ (1 −  b ∗ ) . 
Because these two sides are equal when  p = q , it suffices to show that 
 a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ )/ a rr decreases in  p , which requires
  1 − 2  a ∗ _ 
 a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ )  
∂ a ∗  _∂ p <  1 _  a rr  
∂ a rr  _∂ p . 
If  a ∗ ≥ 1/2 , then the condition above is satisfied. So, assume  a ∗ < 1/2 . In this 
case, the condition above is equivalent to
  1 − 2  a ∗  _____________________________  
 (1 −  a ∗ ) (2 +  (1 + δ) p (1 − 2  a ∗ ) ) <  
1 _ 
2 − 2p a rr , 
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which holds for all  a ∗ < 1/2 .
Finally, we establish that  p ≤ 2/3 implies  ℓ _ rr >  ℓ _ ∗ . Because the latter is equiv-
alent to
  
 (2 − p)  a ∗ 
 _
 (2 − q)  b ∗ <  
p
 _q , 
it is sufficient to establish that  (2 − p)  a ∗ /p decreases in  p , i.e.,
  −2 a ∗ +  (2 − p) p  ∂ a ∗  _∂ p = −2 a ∗ +  (2 − p)  2 a 
∗   ____________________ 
2 +  (1 + δ) p (1 − 2 a ∗ ) < 0. 
This inequality holds because  p ≤ 2/3 implies  a ∗ < 1/2 .
(ii) We have shown in the text that  a rR <  a ∗ . As in part (i) of the proof,  q < p 
implies  b rR <  a rR .
In an  rR -equilibrium, the likelihood ratio corresponding to event  rR 
is  ℓ(rR) = p λ v  a rR (1 −  a rR )/(q λ l  b rR (1 −  b rR )) , and the likelihood ratio correspond-
ing to event  r is  ℓ(r) =  λ v (2 − p)  a rR /( λ l (2 − q) b rR ) . The event  rϕ occurs when-
ever  V 1 exists and makes a report (because  V 2 does not report as  rr does not lead 
to arrest). The corresponding likelihood ratio is  ℓ(rϕ) =  λ v  a rR /( λ l  b rR ) > ℓ(r) . 
An  rR -equilibrium exists if
  ℓ ˆ ∈  ( ℓ _ rR ,  ℓ –rR ] ≡  (  λ v  a rR  _ λ l  b rR ,   p λ v  a rR (1 −  a rR )   ______________q λ l  b rR (1 −  b rR ) ] . 
The events  R and  rr are off equilibrium, and we can assign  off-equilibrium beliefs 
such that their corresponding likelihood ratios are below the standard of proof.
To show that the interval  ( ℓ _ rR ,  ℓ –rR ] is  nonempty, we need to show that 
 p(1 −  a rR ) > q(1 −  b rR ) . It suffices to show that the  left-hand side of this inequal-
ity is increasing in  p , which requires
  1 −  a rR − p  ∂ a rR  _∂ p = 1 −  a rR −  
2  a rR   ____________________  
2 +  (1 + δ) p (1 − 2  a rR ) > 0. 
It is straightforward to verify that  F rR (1/2; p) < 0 . As  F rR ( ⋅ ; p) is  single crossing 
from above, we have  a rR < 1/2 , which implies that the inequality condition dis-
played above holds.
Next we show that
  
 a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ ) 
 _
 b ∗ (1 −  b ∗ ) <  
 a rR (1 −  a rR ) 
 ___________
 b rR (1 −  b rR ) . 
It is sufficient to show that  ( a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ ))/( a rR (1 −  a rR )) decreases in  p , i.e.,
  1 − 2  a ∗ _ 
 a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ )  
∂ a ∗  _∂ p −  
1 − 2  a rR  ___________ 
 a rR (1 −  a rR )  
∂ a rR  ∂ p < 0. 
Plugging in the partial derivatives, this is equivalent to
  1 − 2  a ∗  _____________________________  
 (1 −  a ∗ ) (2 +  (1 + δ) p (1 − 2  a ∗ ) ) −  
1 − 2  a rR   ______________________________  
 (1 −  a rR ) (2 +  (1 + δ) p (1 − 2  a rR ) ) < 0, 
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which reduces to
  (1 + δ) p (1 − 2  a ∗ ) (1 − 2  a rR ) ( a ∗ −  a rR ) < 2 ( a ⁎ −  a rR ) . 
Because  a ∗ >  a rR , the inequality above is true. This establishes that  ℓ –∗ <  ℓ –rR .
Finally, we show that  p ≤ 2/3 implies
  
 (2 − p)  a ∗ 
 _
 (2 − b)  b ∗ <  
 a rR  _
 b rR 
. 
It suffices to show that  (2 − p)  a ∗ / a rR decreases in  p , which is equivalent to
  −1 +  4 (2 − p) (1 + δ) ( a 
∗ −  a rR ) 
    ____________________________________________   
 (2 +  (1 + δ) p (1 − 2  a ∗ ) ) (2 +  (1 + δ) p (1 − 2  a rR ) ) < 0. 
The  left-hand side is increasing in  δ . Therefore, it is sufficient to establish that
  −1 +  2 (2 − p) ( a 
∗ −  a rR ) 
   _______________________________   
 (1 + p (1 − 2  a ∗ ) ) (1 + p (1 − 2  a rR ) ) < 0. 
From equations (4) and (9), we obtain
  2 ( a ∗ −  a rR ) = pδ − p (1 + δ) ( a ∗ (1 −  a ∗ ) −  a rR (1 −  a rR ) ) < pδ, 
because  p ≤ 2/3 implies  a ∗ < 1/2 . Hence,  2(2 − p)( a ∗ −  a rR ) < 1 , which 
establishes that  ℓ _ ∗ <  ℓ _ rR . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7:
(a) Let  E denote the set of events   such that  ℓ( ) ≥  ℓ ˆ (i.e., the set of events that 
lead to an arrest). In an  r -equilibrium,  r ∈ E and  R ∉ E . If  r ∈ E , then it does not 
matter whether any of  rϕ ,  rr , and  rR is in  E . The events  rϕ and  rr will not appear 
because the game ends right after  r . The event  rR is off equilibrium because within 
a period after  r , no one has incentive to make a delayed report.
In an  r -equilibrium, reporting immediately gives a new victim  1 − c . Not report-
ing gives her  (1/2) paδ/(1 − (1/2) pa) (when the victim is  V 1 and  V 2 exists and 
reports with probability  a ). The equilibrium probability of reporting right away, 
denoted  a r , is defined by the solution to the following equation:
  F r (a; p) ≡ 1 − a −  (1/2) pa _______ 1 − (1/2) pa δ = 0. 
A new libeler reports right away with probability  b r , which satisfies  F r ( b r ; q) = 0 . 
As  F r (a; p) is  single crossing from above in  a and is decreasing in  p ,  a r is decreasing 
in  p . From this we obtain  a r <  b r .
The event  r occurs either when  V 1 reports immediately (which happens with 
probability  (1/2) λ v  a r ) or when  V 2 reports immediately if  V 1 does not report (which 
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happens with probability  (1/2)(1 − p a r ) λ v  a r ). The corresponding likelihood ratio is 
 ℓ(r) =  λ v (2 − p a r )  a r /( λ l (2 − q b r ) b r ) . Thus, an  r -equilibrium exists if and only if
  ℓ ˆ ≤  ℓ –r ≡   λ v (2 − p a r ) a r   ____________ λ l (2 − q b r ) b r . 
The event  R is off equilibrium, and we can assign  off-equilibrium beliefs such that 
 ℓ(R) <  ℓ ˆ. Note that  ℓ –r <  λ v / λ l if and only if  (2 − p a r )  a r /((2 − q b r )  b r ) < 1 . 
This condition is true because  p > q and  (2 − p a r )  a r is decreasing in  p .(b) We next consider an  R -equilibrium, in which  R ∈ E but  r ∉ E . If  r ∉ E , 
then  rϕ is not in  E . Otherwise, after  r , no one (victim or libeler) will report. So the 
belief after  rϕ should be the same as the belief after  r , which forms a contradiction. 
It follows that there are only four possible types of  R -equilibrium:
(i)  r ∉ E ,  R ∈ E ,  rr ∈ E ,  rR ∈ E ;
(ii)  r ∉ E ,  R ∈ E ,  rr ∉ E ,  rR ∈ E ;
(iii)  r ∉ E ,  R ∈ E ,  rr ∈ E ,  rR ∉ E ;
(iv)  r ∉ E ,  R ∈ E ,  rr ∉ E ,  rR ∉ E .




1 − (1/2) pa δ +  
(1/2) p (1 − a) 
  _________
1 − (1/2) pa − c. 




1 − (1/2) pa δ (1 − c) +  
(1/2) p (1 − a) 
  _________
1 − (1/2) pa +  
(1/2) (1 − pa) 
  _________
1 − (1/2) pa δ (1 − c) , 
because any  V 1 can delay reporting to achieve an arrest even if  V 2 does not exist. Thus, 
not reporting immediately dominates reporting immediately even when  c = 0 . 
It follows that the equilibrium probabilities of reporting immediately by new victims 
and new libelers are  a R =  b R = 0 . Only event  R occurs in equilibrium;  rr and  rR 
are  off-equilibrium events. The likelihood ratio associated with event  R is  λ v / λ l . 
Thus, an  R -equilibrium exists if and only if
  ℓ ˆ ≤  ℓ –R ≡   λ v  _ λ l . 
In case (ii), the payoff from reporting immediately is smaller than that in case (i) 
(because the first term of that payoff becomes  0 when  rr does not lead to arrest), 
but the payoff from not reporting immediately remains the same as that in case 
(i). It follows that not reporting immediately still dominates reporting immediately. 
The equilibrium probabilities of reporting immediately are  a R =  b R = 0 , and this 
equilibrium exists if and only if  ℓ ˆ ≤  λ v / λ l .
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In case (iii), the payoff difference between reporting immediately and not report-
ing immediately for a new victim is
 f R (c, a; p) ≡  ( (1/2)pa _______ 1 − (1/2)paδ − c) −  (  (1/2)p (1 − a)   _________1 − (1/2)pa +  (1/2) (1 − pa)   _________1 − (1/2)pa δ (1 − c) ) . 
Thus,  f R (a, a; p) = 0 if and only if
  paδ − a (2 − pa) − p (1 − a) −  (1 − pa) δ (1 − a) = 0. 
The  left-hand side of the equation above is convex in  a and is negative at  a = 0 
and at  a = 1 . Therefore,  f R (a, a; p) < 0 for all  a ∈ [0, 1] . The only equilibrium 
probabilities of reporting consistent with this case are  a R =  b R = 0 , and this equi-
librium exists if and only if  ℓ ˆ ≤  λ v / λ l .
In case (iv), the payoff from reporting immediately is smaller than that in case 
(iii), but the payoff from not reporting immediately remains the same as that in case 
(iii). It follows that not reporting immediately still dominates reporting immedi-
ately. The equilibrium probabilities of reporting immediately are  a R =  b R = 0 , 
and this equilibrium exists if and only if  ℓ ˆ ≤  λ v / λ l . ∎
B. Other Model Extensions
Replacing Correlation with Independence.—The correlation between the exis-
tence for the victims across two periods fits the story of recidivism for the sexual 
crime offenders. The key of the analysis is that a victim expects another victim to 
exist with a higher probability than a libeler expects of another libeler. Therefore, 
the difference in the behaviors of victims and libelers can also be generated by 
assuming independence across the two periods, if we let the guilty agent hurt a vic-
tim each period with a higher probability than an innocent agent offends a potential 
libeler. That is, one can alternatively assume that a victim exists with independent 
probability  p ∈ (0, 1) in each period for a true criminal, and a libeler exists with 
independent probability  q ∈ (0, 1) in each period for an innocent agent. Then the 
assumption  p > q plays the same role as in the basic model and generates  a ∗ >  b ∗ . 
All qualitative results in the basic model will remain the same.
Accusers Know Which Period They Are In.—In the main setup, a victim is not sure 
whether she is the early one who gets hurt or the later one who gets hurt. Alternatively, 
we can let victims know the timing (although such an assumption is less realistic in 
our view). For  t = 1, 2 , let  V t denote the victim hurt by  A in period  t , who knows that 
she is hurt in period  t . Just as in the main setup, the crucial strategic variables are the 
probability of leading with an undelayed report. Here, since new victims  V 1 and  V 2 are 
distinctive individuals with knowledge of the calendar time, we denote their probabil-
ity of reporting immediately by  a 1 and  a 2 , respectively. Similarly, we have  b 1 for a new 
 first-period libeler and  b 2 for a new  second-period libeler.
One can show that, just as in the main setup, the net benefits of reporting immedi-
ately for a new  V 1 and for a new  V 2 are both decreasing in the probabilities of leading 
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( a 1 and  a 2 ) by the other victim and increasing in the probability (  p ) of the existence 
of the other victim. That is, we have the same strategic substitution and encourage-
ment effect. It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium values of  a 1 and  a 2 
cannot both decrease in  p . Indeed, when  p is not too large, both  a 1 and  a 2 increase 
in  p . In this case, we have  a t >  b t for  t = 1, 2 in a corroboration equilibrium of 
this alternative model.
More Victims.—Increasing the number of victims or libelers affects the incentive 
to make a crime allegation through both the encouragement effect and the strategic 
substitution effect. We illustrate this point by showing that having more potential 
victims does not necessarily reduce the probability that a new victim will lodge 
an immediate report, because the encouragement effect may sometimes outweigh 
the  freeriding effect to cause these victims to be more forthcoming in making an 
allegation.
Consider the following simple modification of the basic model. In period 1, guilty 
agent  A hurts one victim with probability  p . In period 2, he hurts two victims with 
probability  p . Similarly, an innocent agent  A offends one person with probability  q 
in period 1, and another two persons with probability  q in period 2. We study a 
corroboration equilibrium in which at least two accusations against  A ( rr or  rR ) are 
needed before the authorities will arrest him.
The key difference from the basic model is that a victim who learns that there is 
a prior report against  A does not necessarily report against him (i.e.,  α ˆ 2 (c) ≠ 1 ) 
because she may count on the other victim in period 2 to file a report. One can show 
that  α ˆ 2 (c) = 1 if and only if  c ≤ 1/2 .
Given such a strategy by  V 2 , there are two opposing effects on the incentive of a 
new victim to report immediately. First, if a victim is  V 1 , she is worried that the two 
victims in period 2 may not corroborate her allegation because these two victims 
 freeride on each other (the probability that at least one of these two victims will 
corroborate  V 1 ’s report is only  3/4 ), which reduces her incentive to report imme-
diately. On the other hand, if a victim is  V 2 , lodging a complaint immediately may 
lead to an arrest if it is corroborated by a contemporary victim, even if  V 1 does not 
exist. This second effect raises the payoff from reporting immediately. Which of 
these two effects dominates will depend on parameter values. It is not the case that 
having more potential victims always causes each new victim to be less forthcoming 
in lodging a complaint.
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